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This project examines American scholar W.E.B.’s DuBois’ idea of “double consciousness”, 
from his book The Souls of Black Folk (1903). The idea of “double consciousness” has and 
continues to be utilized by Black scholars and artists in literary, theoretical, and 
psychological contexts, some of which I hope my paper will adequately survey. I begin by 
examining “double consciousness” from the perspective of particulars by understanding Du 
Bois’s original idea and the specificities of the American context he himself was a part of and 
wrote of, considering the legacy of slavery. Then, by focusing primarily on writers such as 
Frantz Fanon, Richard Wright and Paul Gilroy, succeeding Du Bois, the paper will discuss 
the various subtleties of “doubleness” present in these works and how they can be cross-
referenced to other historical and cultural movements. Framing this discussion in light of 
“double consciousness” as a “gift” or potential ability versus as a purely restrictive 
experience demonstrates how the antimonies of “doubleness” works to disprove specific 
kinds of dualism. Inadvertently the paper will advocate the need for a change in dialectics to 
centralize Black notions of Being into an academic tradition that has historically limited the 
definition of humanity. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This paper attempts to explore an idea created by activist and academic W.E.B. Du Bois, first 
written in his 1903 book The Souls of Black Folk. The idea, called “double consciousness” 
describes the experience of living in racist society where one feels both “Black” and 
“American”. On the one hand, the individual is made aware of their race through being 
perceived in a certain way by mainstream American society which considers “whiteness” the 
default. On the other hand, the individual had only known life in America and had been 
disconnected from their heritage. Using this idea, the paper looks at how Du Bois used the 
idea in his life and work and the way it was adapted by other thinkers after him. I discuss 
how some see “double consciousness” as an ability with great power but at the same time an 
experience that can greatly limit one’s freedom. In light of this, I look at and consider the 
history that “double consciousness” is tied to (Slavery) and how this particular experience is 
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I began the research and conception of this thesis two years ago, at a time when Black 
scholars and activists continued to labour the task of recognizing and dismantling systemic 
racism on all fronts, both in North America and across the globe. As a student approaching 
this subject, I did not foresee that I would finish my project during the midst of a revolution 
in the form of the 2020 protests sparked by the murder of George Floyd and systemic 
racialized police brutality, which grew to encompass the social and economic disparity based 
on race in the United States and the world. In my experience of witnessing these events (from 
a place of immense privilege), I watched the arms race to control the narrative of these 
movements and how they were perceived. I did not have to read a news article to hear early 
on about the horrors of the “looting and violence” of protestors that had been posed as the 
main injustice, rather the murders. This was widely accepted too, until confronting ideas and 
information made their way to the collective consciousnesses. Even if for only a short time, 
questions were brought up not only on the methods of institutions such as policing; but 
questioning the roots of this institution and the very role of it altogether. The first view did 
not cease to exist; nor has the plight of the protestors, or the tragic loss of life. And right 
before our eyes, we are witnessing the interconnectedness of the many narratives that had 
been carefully instilled for many centuries, as a kind of inheritance.  
Figures like William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois and his successors that I discuss in 
this paper had to take on the challenge existing in the same narrative that denied the 
humanity of Black folk in different ways, looking at the world past and present in order to 




as a way of being) that was embodied in the task of these thinkers and thinkers today has 
been largely ignored in academic traditions like philosophy and critical theory. The ideas of 
Black these thinkers (such as double consciousness) are closely related (and sometimes the 
unacknowledged foundations) of notions from  thinkers that are important to Western 
European thought. Yet these ideas should not be studies for what they can bring to the 
hegemony of the academic institution (as they sometimes are) but as crucial to confront the 
indissoluble memory of slavery and racial violence that is still  present.   
I state only my subjective experience of the events of the Summer of 2020, and as a person of 
Canadian settler colonialism descent, I wish to always be reminded of the privilege and bias 
that my words, actions and perspective holds. Yet as a member of the academic community, I 
feel it is the urgent responsibility of myself and each person to whole heartedly commit to not 
only addressing racism of the present, but the foundational inheritance of knowledge that 
allowed for senseless and continual fatality (in both a literal and metaphoric way). As a 
student of the “humanities”, we must admit that until the violence towards Black (and other 





Chapter 1  
1 The Metaphysical Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois  
To begin my thesis, the goal of my first chapter, ultimately, is to explore to what extent 
certain ideas about race can be placed into spatial, temporal, geographical and historical 
categories; and to explore the significance of their transcendence beyond these. 
Throughout this thesis and specifically this chapter I will take a metaphysical approach to 
the phenomenology of race, by examining the various traditions that have emerged in 
critical race theory, stemming directly and indirectly from American sociologist and 
thinker W.E.B. Du Bois and specifically his theory of “double-consciousness”. 
1.1  Embodying Genre: Coming to Know Du Bois’ 
Methodology  
The reason I wish to take this approach, is to look at the way a figure such as Du Bois 
(among others), in the study of not only his ideas but his life, demonstrates the power in 
fragmentation of his idea. In chapters Two and Three, I explore some of the subtle ways 
that this idea embodies the various kinds of splits, not only metaphysically, but 
geographically and otherwise. As I will elaborate more fully in the last chapter, academic 
Paul Gilroy describes Du Bois as someone with a “lack of roots” (117). It is not that he 
did not have knowledge of where he came from (in fact, Du Bois’ family tree is much 
more well known then many other Black Americans). However, when Gilroy describes 
Du Bois in this way, he means to signify that Du Bois’ existential mission (or burden) is 
not to be confined by a certain legacy, whether biographically or intellectually. I would 
like my thesis to be a reflection of his life—beginning with the idea of where he was 
born, then branching into the confusion of finding oneself amongst various inflictions and 
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ideologies (reflecting his travels to Europe), and finally ending in a place with a message 
of liberation (reflecting the end of his life in Africa).  
It may be helpful to understand how Du Bois is regarded by a few relevant thinkers. He is 
clearly a major influence for the thinkers discussed in this paper, certainly for Frantz 
Fanon, Paul Gilroy and contemporary “Afro-Pessimist” thinkers. He is recognized by 
Martin Luther King Jr., who gave a speech during a politically intense time in honour of 
Du Bois. As Martin Halpern conveys in “Honoring Dr. Du Bois: Martin Luther King's 
most radical speech”, King reinstates the importance of Du Bois’ work in a historical 
context and said “Du Bois fought the oppressor with his many gifts” (Halpern 41). The 
idea of “gifts” is an interesting choice of words considering Du Bois’ ideas about “gifts” 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, when considering all the 
influences that Du Bois had, from different subjects and contexts, King’s statement rings 
true—Du Bois was able to combine knowledge from different sources yet achieve a 
product that does not feel disassociated. His work does not go without criticism, but 
despite the short time it had been around before the Civil Rights era, it had already made 
a lasting impact.  
An example of Du Bois’s abilities actually come from outside the framework of the 
humanities or social sciences. It is little known that Du Bois also did incredible research 
in the medical field. In “After 121 Years, It’s Time to Recognize W.E.B. Du Bois as a 
founding Father of Social Epidemiology” (2018), Sharon D. Jones and  Lorraine T. Dean 
explore this often “underappreciated” area of his work, which analyzes inequality in 
medical care due to racism. This topic is coming to light as more questions are being 
asked addressing medical bias in the present medical care system. As the authors of this 
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article assert, Du Bois’ work is often “unacknowledged” in the field of epidemiology, 
despite doing extensive work on the issue (Jones & Dean 232). Even though medicine 
has evolved very much in the past century, these researchers placing Du Bois as a central 
figure provides a way forward to address racial inequality in medicine, and the same can 
be done in the humanities. Furthermore, Du Bois’ medical research not only shows the 
breadth of subjects he was able to draw upon in his work, but his great ability to 
understand the past in order to look ahead.  
Even as more of his underappreciated work is acknowledged, his main sociological work 
and its ongoing potential is still disputed. In the book The Scholar Denied: W.E.B. Du 
Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology (2015), Aldorn Morris argues this very idea. As 
Patricia Collins summarizes in “Du Bois’ Contested Legacy” (her critique of the book): 
"Morris's main argument is simple – racism kept Du Bois out of professional sociology, 
thus denying American sociology access to one of its most significant founders” (Collins 
1398). She criticizes Morris’ for overemphasizing in claiming how much influence Du 
Bois might have had, had he gone the institutional route—and not been stunted by the 
politics of the university. Additionally, she criticizes Morris on the basis of overreaching 
the impact that one person could have on changing the entire trajectory of an established 
discipline, especially given the barriers Du Bois faced. Finally, she points out the lack of 
awareness of intersectionality in Morris’ argument, crediting Du Bois for work that Black 
feminists have done and have received even less recognition for than Du Bois. Collins’ 




However, Collins does bring up a very important issue that plagues the controversy 
around not only Du Bois or even something as specific to sociology or critical theory. 
One of the main problems that Collins has with Morris’ claims is described as follows:  
The Scholar Denied is based on a core premise that a sociological canon exists 
that is organized via a metaphor of family lineage. We pay homage to founding 
fathers or masters of intellectual households whose ideas are perceived as seminal 
to the emergence of our disciplines.” (Collins 1406) 
Collins eloquently describes here the current dysfunction in attempting to combat racism 
(and sexism) in any established academic or intellectual discipline. In both of the above 
attempts (Morris’ but also Jones and Dean’s) to reinstate Du Bois’s ideas into a given 
discipline (sociology and epidemiology respectively)—the tone is concerned not only 
with using and recognizing Du Bois’ ideas but also fitting him in with other (male) 
“founding fathers” to pay homage to before innovating from this foundation.  Such 
attempts are understandable, given the history of denied access to these worlds, but 
Collins and other Black feminists dare to ask the uncomfortable question of whether this 
paternal linkage should be the goal at all. 
In many ways Du Bois makes the perfect person to add to this legacy, to a list of those 
that forged the way in questions of how to address social or cultural issues pertaining to 
race. The breadth of his knowledge may be the very reason why he himself seems to be 
discussed almost more frequently than his work. However, keeping Collin’s critique in 
mind as well as Du Bois’ own “outsider” status, his “lack of roots” allowed him to 
innovate in a way that clearly still resonates with many today. He unapologetically drew 
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from Western sources while embracing a Pan-African agenda. Despite the problems 
inherent to our academic institutions, Du Bois’ approach is something to be embraced.  
1.2 An American Scholar 
Du Bois certainly is in many ways a “global scholar”, at the same time that The Souls of 
Black Folk (1903) has a deeply American quality. In a paradoxical way, this American 
quality can be a starting place amongst the diversity when considering the topics at hand. 
What precisely is so appealing about looking at American texts in this context is that the 
theme of “American-ness” is already there, undeniably woven both into the political and 
personal landscape of the American psyche. Before witnessing this inseparable identity 
expressed in theory, one may first witness it in art, specifically poetry. Poetry and theory 
are similar in that they both make sense of chaotic cultural patterns, allowing the reader 
to look through one tiny window of possibility and clarity—or at least the convincing 
appearance of clarity. Therefore, one may look to look to a poet’s words, and the reality 
they are trying to portray through them, to get an idea of the essence—or appearance of 
essence—about a certain group (Americans in this case). 
Walt Whitman (1819-1892), for example, was deemed “America’s Poet” in part because 
of the way his poems paint a proud and nationalistic picture of the white working class at 
the time. Critics debate whether still where Whitman’s views on race stand, some hold 
him up to an egalitarian ideal of a man who was anti-slavery which went against the grain 
of his time. Others portray him as a product of his time, in terms of his attitude toward the 
oppression of African Americans in enforcing racist stereotypes. His celebration of a 
blue-collared working life (in such works as “America” and “I Hear America Singing”), 
combined with his famous “celebration of himself,” can be seen as part of the history in 
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the formation of a unique identity to white Americans. Even his now infamous form of 
verse refused to follow old European poetic traditions for the sake of forming a new one; 
suggesting he sought to make his vision of “American-ness” a part of the cultural 
patrimony he believed to be forging.   
This thesis is not about Walt Whitman, or his poems, but I bring him up to help articulate 
an important moment of the longstanding history of American race relations. Returning 
to the idea of consciousness, it becomes more and more evident that the first person voice 
in Whitman’s poems, whether he speaks as himself or someone else, seems to give the 
impression of ultimate freedom to associate or disassociate with any part of the American 
society, and of, ultimately, possessing the ability to exist as an entity free of any labels. 
For the soul that inhabits the voice in Whitman’s poems, the presence of one’s body is a 
conscious decision, rather than a sentence to be forever treated and grouped into a certain 
category. As Whitman writes in “I Sing the Body Electric” (1855): 
The voice, articulation, language, whispering, shouting aloud,  
Food, drink, pulse, digestion, sweat, sleep, walking, swimming,  
Poise on the hips, leaping, reclining, embracing, arm-curving and tightening,  
The continual changes of the flex of the mouth, and around the eyes,  
The skin, the sunburnt shade, freckles, hair,  
The curious sympathy one feels when feeling with the hand the naked meat of the 
body,  
The circling rivers the breath, and breathing it in and out,  




The thin red jellies within you or within me, the bones and the marrow in the 
bones,  
The exquisite realization of health;  
O I say these are not the parts and poems of the body only, but of the soul,  
O I say now these are the soul! (Whitman, 9.25-35) 
Here, the body (of a white subject) is separated into parts, and actions in which the 
discovery of what the body can do is treated as a luxury, (i.e. “the exquisite realization of 
health”). This is not the same ekphrasis used to describe the physical attributes of a 
woman in a Woodsworth sonnet, in fact gender is not exclusively mentioned at all. The 
relationship between connecting the body to the soul is done callously so; as if the subject 
can discover their body freely. The skin is just that, skin with no prior attached 
connotations. The celebration of the human form in Whitman’s poem actually avoids 
specificity; he avoids describing any one body part in a way that suggests diversity. One 
of the only references to a particular attribute to differentiate between bodies is directly 
about skin tone, celebrating the inclusivity of all white bodies, and all white souls. 
 The sentiment which Whitman illustrates here, as “America’s Poet”, clearly resonates 
with many white Americans, and is much different to the relationship to the self and body 
that W.E.B. Du Bois writes about in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). There are 
similarities between the idea of these writers, other than both inspiring famous poets to 
come. In Whitman’s defying many of the rules of classic poetry and Du Bois’ novel 
defying any easily identifiable genre, one finds an existential notion of reconciling the 
uniqueness of the American experience to a universal one. Perhaps it is even as far as 
introducing the American experience as the new default for any experience.  
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The notion of existentialism amd its conceptions and relationship to the idea of double 
consciousness is an idea which I return to throughout this paper. A tributary of classic 
existentialism rests with Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea of “radical freedom” which lends itself to 
not only the tone of Whitman’s poem in carving an American identity, but also to the 
legal foundations of the United States found in documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence (1776). Du Bois’ work relates the particular history of slavery in the 
United States to the experience of oppressed people of any kind; Du Bois himself 
struggled with his own American identity. He also vastly loved and idolized other 
cultures, both in Europe and Africa incorporating elements of both in his book. Still, 
seeping through the lines of The Souls of Black Folk is the same spirit of a kind of 
“radical freedom”—not as a given, but as a goal made with hope. The importance of this 
relation in Du Bois’ book contributes to the idea that his work is uniquely American 
insofar as freedom is regarded, by Americans, as a very American ideal: not just legal 
freedom but also and probably more importantly in the way that Whitman approaches it, 
as a feeling or mindset and not contradicting his other political aspirations.  
1.3 Double Consciousness as a Particular 
The style (in addition to the content) of The Souls of Black Folk lends itself to such an 
idea. The book is written in a tone that is both stately and metaphoric and definitely 
indicative of the turn of the century excitement. In the second chapter of the book, “Of 
the Dawn of Freedom”, Du Bois begins with the idea of the present situation, citing the 
main problem of the twentieth century as he states is “the color-line”. He then however 
spends most of the chapter recounting the recent history of the Civil War, and the formal 
and legal ending of slavery legally, before returning to the topic of present day. In doing 
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so, Du Bois reminds the reader that the present is essentially tied to history. There is no 
easy map for the future without addressing the not so long ago history. The chapter 
focuses on the great difficulty endured during this time in transitioning the lives of former 
slaves into a semblance of some kind of freedom, and the progress made but also the 
great failures, painting a picture of the resulting chaos.   
Du Bois’ writing is rich with the weight of this history, and throughout the text he 
balances those historical implications with his own personal experiences and visions of 
the future in order to create the most comprehensive account of the African American 
experience available at the time. But while Du Bois does not hide his intentions to gain 
more access to education, voting and civil rights, it is clear that while he was in part 
forming the beginnings of American racial phenomenology, the unique circumstances 
and history can never be removed. As long as there was (or is) still material progress to 
be made, that is central to any discussion about the relational aspect of body and mind. 
The inter-disciplinary nature of  Du Bois’ work is a facet has been noted by Reiland 
Rabaka in W. E. B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-First Century: An Essay on 
Africana Critical Theory, as not only a stylistic component but as a way to deal 
comprehensively with the extensive and complex structures affecting Black populations 
(Rabaka 4). While Rabaka’s work covers a range of ideas, his ability to address and put 
into conversation race theorists from various time periods make his work incredibly 
fruitful. Additionally, he articulates the goals of critical race theory (African critical race 
theory or “Africana”) in a way that both places it within the tradition of “classic” critical 
theory and philosophy but also its necessity to be distinguished on its own. I argue that 
Rabaka’s usage of Du Bois fundamentally reflects the hopeful and “optimist” element of 
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Du Bois’ work, contrasting other schools of thought (that will be discussed in later 
chapters) that utilize cynicism to describe the situation of not only Black Americans, but 
Blackness as a whole.  
Rabaka’s stance on the critical perspective of Du Bois stems from a frustration that much 
of this reception tends to overlook the complexity of his work. What he means by this 
sentiment is that the multi-faceted and interdisciplinary nature of his work is chronically 
taken at face value and not properly comprehended. It is not solely a way to look at 
complex issues taking into account many factors, but also a way to give oneself “roots”, a 
history and ancestry that had been violently repressed. Part of Rabaka’s analysis seeks to 
look at Du Bois in relation to mainstream critical theory. In doing so, he not only 
interprets Du Bois’ writing and its significance, but actually reinterprets critical theory 
itself to broaden its traditional Eurocentric approach. Rabaka notes that Du Bois’ work 
not only utilizes traditionally European perspectives, but also adapts them using 
classically African perspectives, and melds the two together. For example, each chapter 
of The Souls of Black Folk begins with a poem or fragment by a European writer and a 
musical score typically from a spiritual musical score (traditionally African American). 
Even if, as some of his critics say, Du Bois is contradictory on his stance at times, he 
already creates with these elements a new and unprecedented trajectory for thinking of 
America and its racial discord. 
Reading Rabaka in relation to Du Bois is helpful not only for the way it breathes new 
light into an over one hundred years old text, but also for the way that Rabaka is able to 
take a step back in a metaphysical sense and look first at the goals of critical theory, how 
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it relates to his own goals, and finally how Du Bois fits in to its history. As Rabaka 
writes: 
The paradigms and points of departure for critical theorists vary depending on the 
theorist’ race, gender, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, nationality, 
intellectual interests and political persuasions. For instance, many European 
critical theorists turn to Hegel, Marx, Freud, Gramsci, Sartre, and/or the Frankfurt 
School…among others, because they understand these thinkers’ thoughts and 
texts to speak in special ways to modern and/postmodern life-worlds and lived-
experiences…My work, Africana critical theory, utilizes the thought and texts of 
Africana intellectual ancestors as critical theoretical paradigms and points of 
departure because so much of their thought is not simply problem-posing but 
solution-providing where the specific life-struggles of persons of African 
descent…are concerned…(Rabaka 62) 
 Rabaka’s approach demonstrates the way in which critical theory itself, a discipline 
which is typically dedicated to being constantly breaking down norms and hegemony is 
still very much bound to the same biases it critiques. The rootedness of this tendency in 
modernity will be elaborated more upon in Chapter Three. However, the sentiment in 
Rabaka’s discussion of lived-experience is a reminder of the often unfeasible ability of an 
academic, writer or person in general to conceptualize the experience of another. 
Rabaka’s point makes use of this inevitability by embracing his own unique experiences 
and other’s and integrating them into his work. The result of avoiding either extreme is in 
part to achieve Rabaka’s goal of critical theory: “using all (without regard to race, 
gender, class, sexual orientation, and/or religious affiliation) accumulated radical thought 
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and revolutionary practices in the interest of liberation and social(ist) transformation” 
(Rabaka 66).  
This broader goal for critical theory, of which Rabaka’s own writings on Africana studies 
is a part, is also useful to create inclusivity, both culturally and academically, when 
attempting to engage with critical works. It seems Rabaka, using figures such as Du Bois 
wishes not to dismantle the entirety of the “founding Fatherhood” in the same manner as 
Collins, but rather build on this knowledge using a more inclusive tone. For example, as I 
discuss in Chapter Two, Jean-Paul Sartre can be included in the discussion since his ideas 
were adapted by a writer like Frantz Fanon. However, even if a European thinker like 
Sartre can be adapted and understood by all different kinds of people, his writing, by the 
examples chosen and way he presents ideas, can be isolating to some because of the way 
his European and male perspective acts an objective or neutral stance rather than 
admitting these things play a role in his perspective. With the exemplary figures he uses 
in Being and Nothingness (1956) to describe his idea of “bad faith”—a woman, a gay 
man and a waiter—and applying the freedom he might enjoy as a white (collar) man in 
French society, Sartre, like Whitman before him, appears not to recognize the structures 
that would make the same choices more difficult for the marginalized groups these 
figures exemplify.  
While Sartre may be of his time and prone to these biases, even in recognizing such,  
Rabaka poses the issue which is central as to why more thinkers from outside a 
Eurocentric context must be used as “points of departure”. As he claims, there is more to 
theorizing than “problem-posing”; understanding these “solution-providing” contexts is 
important in order to create structural changes. Additionally, as Rabaka points out, this 
13 
 
fundamental difference also impacts the ultimate goals of what the theorist is aiming to 
achieve. He writes: “Africana critical theory is not thought-for-thought’s sake (as it often 
seems is the case with so much contemporary Africana-philosophy notwithstanding); on 
the contrary, Africana critical theory is thought for-life-and-liberation’s sake” (Rabaka 
67). He continues from this that Africana critical theory is “a new way of thinking and 
doing revolution that is based and constantly being built on the radicalisms and 
revolutions of the past” (67). The immediate need for action and improvement in certain 
communities means that there is a sense of importance about the topics being discussed, 
and it comes across stylistically in Rabaka’s writing, reflected also in the writing of Du 
Bois. The way that Rabaka clearly states these goals demonstrates a move away from 
aristocratic loftiness often found in philosophical texts—i.e. allegorical or overly-
metaphoric writing, providing the argument at the end of book or paragraph. He is 
integrating the idea of “thought-for-life-and-liberation’s sake” and by doing so, making 
his ideas accessible to not only those privileged to have been trained academically in this 
history.  
While critical race theory as a whole has access to various inter-disciplinary methods, as 
articulated by Rabaka, the idea of having neat categories of Eurocentric tradition and then 
African studies, gender studies, etc. being branched is a problem within itself and a 
reason that it still centralizes the European tradition as a kind of “original”. This idea is 
taken up in very different ways which will be explored in Chapter Three. However, the 
way in which Rabaka analyzes Du Bois is one that celebrated other cultures and 
innovated from them despite the racism he endured. More so, Du Bois was passionate 
about the generosity of people of colour even in the face of oppression or adversity. Even 
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in his positioning of Black Americans as a “problem” as he does multiple times 
throughout his work, it fundamentally implies there is a solution to be had. This is 
fundamental difference from the view of subaltern experience, common in postcolonial 
studies, that uses language to emphasizes the subaltern’s lack of power. In another one of 
Rabaka’s texts: “The Souls of White Folk: W.E.B. Du Bois’s Critique of White 
Supremacy and Contributions to Critical White Studies,” he states the following: 
Here Du Bois notes major “gifts” or contributions to culture and civilization that 
various people of color have made throughout human history, many of them in 
their pre-colonial (or, rather pre-European colonial) periods. He does not 
diminish or attempt to downplay the “greatness of Europe,” but observes that 
“the triumphs of European civilization lie quite outside and beyond Europe.” 
From Du Bois’s racial frame of reference, each ethnocultural group or, rather, 
each “race” has a “great message...for humanity… He was extremely confident 
in the greatness of Africana peoples’ past and present gift(s) and spirit of giving, 
even in the face of and often, it seemed, in spite of their endurance and 
experience of holocaust, enslavement, colonization, segregation, and so forth. 
(Rabaka par. 11).  
In this interpretation of Du Bois’ work, Rabaka has already begun to carve out 
perceptions of a new tradition separate from the Eurocentric sphere, i.e. the idea of gift as 
a means of sharing knowledge as opposed to the capitalization of knowledge or 
reservation of knowledge for specific privileged classes. The use of the idea of a “gift” 
changes the relationship between colonizer and colonized to restore some power back to 
those being oppressed. Ultimately the extreme violence that people of African descent 
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faced (and continue to face) did not destroy their metaphysical being but rather 
immortalized it.  
Du Bois not only applied to his way of thinking (which in many ways defied and 
continues to defy the mainstream school of thought) to the roots of Western civilization 
on a global scale, but to America. In his 1935 book, Black Reconstruction in America: An 
Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to 
Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880 he discusses the history of the 
Reconstruction Era (1863-1877). This book is more than just an account of this time 
period. It can be used as a case study to show not only the complexity of Du Bois’ work, 
but the potential. It has become a point of contention as this book in recent times has been 
reanalyzed with a Marxist lens as its primary interpretation and the question of if such a 
reading takes away from a Pan-African message (Anderson 1). Looking back at the 
origins of this book one needs not to look further than the highest earning films of all 
time, Gone With the Wind (1939) made only four years after the book was published as to 
why an alternative perspective to the Reconstruction Era was necessary. Given that 
income inequality between white and black Americans has only continued to increase in 
the United States within the last 40 years, it is not surprising why this book is read as a 
critique of capitalism (Devounte and Nwafor 161). It was not simple to relay the 
underling barriers that newly freed former slaves endured during this time in sociological 
terms alone. As Allison Powers explains in “Tragedy Made Flesh Constitutional 
Lawlessness in Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction”: 
[Du Bois] argues that this fiction is sustained through a paradoxical pairing of two 
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separate and contradictory fictions: on the one hand, “that bizarre doctrine of race 
that makes most men inferior to the few” (725) and, on the other, the “Great 
American Assumption” that “wealth is mainly the result of its owner’s efforts and 
that any average worker can by thrift become a capitalist” (183). (Powers 108). 
The description of these two “fictions” not only work to describe the major issues of the 
era, but also the challenge Du Bois faced in telling the history of this era and its 
significance. According to the book The Dunning School: Historians, Race, and the 
Meaning of Reconstruction (2013) by John David Smith and Vincent Lowery, a widely 
accepted view of Reconstruction existed, via the Dunning School, which was mainly 
based on the ideas of one professor and his students (1-3). The historical view that 
essentially exaggerated and magnified already existing conceptions about Reconstruction 
as a time Southern whites were victimized at the hands of Republicans, removing their 
democracy and rights and in general focusing on white suffrage during this time (2-3).  
Furthermore, this view was not seen as biased or one of many but actually taken to 
greatly influence the teaching of this era, up to the graduate level. The Reconstruction era 
was an opportunity for Black Americans to be seen in a new light outside the idea of 
slavery, but the Dunning School helped ensure the idea for many that newly developing 
voting laws and education were mistakes that ultimately hurt whites. So while critiquing 
the economic system that never allowed individuals to ever “catch up” and the racism 
that influenced such a system is a main priority for Du Bois, this could not be his final 
position on Reconstruction. By focusing on the achievements of the “freedman” as 
important and necessary contributions to Reconstruction, despite the political turbulence, 
he placed the freedman in a central role, rather than either one of antagonist or victim. 
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While the Reconstruction era was seen as a failure by the Dunning School for one reason 
and a failure by Marxists/antiracists for another, Du Bois does not concede to its 
complete failure, despite recognizing it as a “tragedy”. He does so not to downplay the 
horrendous injustices of this era, but rather to carefully change the narrative. The 
Dunning School allowed the legacy of slavery ending to fundamentally portray Black 
freedom as a threat to order and ideals valued by (especially Southern) Americans. By 
showing the contradiction of white supremacy which poses Black people as both a threat 
and inferior, he changes the narratives on two accounts. On the one hand he accepts the 
white supremacist premises to show how even within their own standards and beliefs, 
their portrayal of this era was wrong. Then, on the other hand he seeks to work off other 
premises—whether they are Marxist or Pan-African—to  critique the entirety of the 
American system as a whole. To revert solely to a singular framework is a mistake that 
does not encompass the entirety of the weight of this history. 
 While Rabaka speaks on Africana studies as a whole, the question still remains if there 
can be distinguished a unique American perspective out of the larger Africana one. This 
is not to imply a nationalistic sense in the work itself, as even Du Bois seems to praise 
Europe and some notions of European culture in some of his writing. Rather, when 
looking at a phenomenon experienced by people throughout many times and places, 
understanding the perspective of the continuity of those who hold these experiences is 
immensely important.  
While Rabaka’s work attempts to shift ideas in critical theory, the entirety of this work 
(or any work in theory) cannot be disassociated from history. As seen in the case study of 
the Dunning School, it was not only the policies and movements of Reconstruction that 
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affected the future but what was said about what happened during this time. In a more 
relevant sense, adapting the ideas of such twentieth century thinkers as Walter Benjamin 
and Paul Gilroy, history becomes an important link in overcoming and producing 
narratives that allow for understanding oneself and others. Gilroy, who comes from 
outside the American tradition, likens the notion of slavery in both in the literal sense of 
the institution of slavery and the metaphoric Hegelian sense in his book The Black 
Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993). Further ideas from this book and 
modernity will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, but Gilroy’s ability to 
string the particularity of events that happened in specific geographical locations (i.e. 
slavery in the United States) to broader themes in history that connect all people of a 
certain heritage (i.e. all affected by the trans-Atlantic slave trade) makes great strides in 
recentralizing the often fragmented discussion of race.  
In his discussion of “Masters, Mistresses, and Slaves” in The Black Atlantic Gilroy 
asserts: “Focusing on the role of intellectuals within modernity is an important way of 
drawing out the particularity that lurks beneath the universalist claims of the 
Enlightenment project which was, in theory, valid for humanity as a whole even if 
humanity was to be rather restrictively defined” (43). Gilroy’s work dismantles this 
particularity by introducing the “black Atlantic” as a singularity—which lends itself 
easily to Rabaka’s notion of integrating into contemporary critical discourse various 
traditions of thought rather than only European. As he puts it: “Slavery as the premise of 
modernity also gives us the chance to reopen discussion of the origins of black politics in 
the Euro-American age of revolution” (54). To pose slavery as “the premise of 
modernity” indicates a clear shift in thought from a Eurocentric or American-centric idea 
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of modernity to a Black diasporic one: “The way these populations continue to make 
creative, communicative use of the memory of slavery away from the twin positions that 
have overdetermined the debate on modernity so far—an uncritical and complacent 
rationalism and a self-conscious and rhetorical anti-humanism” (54). Gilroy’s description 
of these two positions overlaps with Rabaka’s idea about the purpose of critical theory 
and demonstrates a clear gap in the collective consciousness of the present. The 
overwhelming refusal to be critical becomes a symptom of modernity, contradicting the 
goal of theory to make changes. Gilroy then goes on to use Benjamin’s theory in order 
for the “primal history of modernity” to be “reconstructed from the slave’s point of view” 
(54). The result of this shift is not the way slavery is viewed but how history is viewed—
from a specific event to an ongoing belief system that affects societal and personal 
relationships today.  
The memory of slavery in history, of course, is for the direct descendants of its legacy to 
dominate the narrative, and for those outside of it is important to take direction in that 
regard. However in recentralizing the topic in this manner Gilroy also demonstrates the 
power it holds. Immediately, the idea of the slave trade disrupts the “complacent 
rationalism” of Western modernity, and the self-perpetuating idea that it was founded in 
this rationalism. If we are to become connected to history, the history that accounts for 
racial brutality demonstrates the most major fracture.  
Additionally, the relationality between “slaves” and “slaveholders” complicates a very 
specific version of the problem of “otherness”. The contradiction of the identity of a 
group being dependent on the hatred of another, and therefore the existence of that group 
itself, is often pondered in theory; the refocusing through the history of slavery also 
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highlights this issue. In the slavery context, “slaveholders” will always reproduce the idea 
that while they may be the perpetrators, they are also the liberators. In the United States, 
this means that figures such as Abraham Lincoln and the end of the Civil War become 
more important in the retelling of this history rather than the focus on the resistance or 
lives of Black figures. Rather than slavery as an integral part of America’s fabric, 
something that specifically aided its immense economical foundations and the 
generations of racism to follow, it becomes part of world history that many nations took 
part in, including African nations. While this is true, it leads to the dangerous idea that 
the United States specifically ended slavery and holds itself as a beacon of freedom, 
which allows some of the very real problems of racism to still exist today, generations 
later.  
The complexity of Du Bois’ work accounts for these issues in more ways than one. Du 
Bois’ approach is always, in many ways, twofold, part of the reason he is so often 
misunderstood. This does not mean he is not, in any way, moderate; in fact he is quite the 
opposite. While one may argue that his work should be interpreted in a specific school of 
thought, and this may be helpful to draw out certain points this can risk losing this useful 
tension. The tension is neither cynical or romantic and cannot be solved by 
interpretations—it can only truly be solved by liberation, which makes it different than 
other points of contention about, for example, human nature. I believe double 
consciousness is a way of framing this tension, and already has and is being use by Black 




Before understanding it as such, understanding double consciousness in its original 
context is key. This context relates to a topic I have already been attempting to cultivate, 
American identity and its significance. As previously mentioned, Du Bois spends a great 
deal of time focused on cultivating his social theory around the recent history, social 
institution and position of African Americans using the lens of his own personal 
experience. He discusses the theory of double consciousness at the beginning of the 
The Souls of Black Folk, but does not necessarily dwell on it for the remainder of the 
book. He begins by describing how it feels to “[be] a problem” as a “strange experience”, 
recalling in his memory of the first time he felt “different” because his race and the 
profound moment of realization (Du Bois 8). He then goes on to explain: 
…the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second 
sight in this American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other 
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being 
torn asunder (Du Bois 9). 
In this passage alone, Du Bois already gives the reader many hints (in a subtle yet poetic 
way) about double-consciousness. He uses the idea of the “seventh son”, which in 
folklore is indictive of a family’s seventh son being born with special power(s). The 
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“powers” differ dependent on which country the folklore is being told; some countries 
leaning more towards the powers being a “curse” and some leaning towards the powers 
being a great ability to understand the world (a view which tends to more common in the 
United States). Combining the idea of being “gifted” (this idea reoccurring in Du Bois 
work) with that of “second sight”, Du Bois already affirms the idea that double-
consciousness is a positive thing, giving the Black subject a kind of view on the world 
that is not available to others. However, it is not clear that this “ability” is totally 
available or accessible to anyone experiencing double-consciousness, at any time. As he 
defines the idea later in the quote, the language shifts more and more towards expressing 
the pure exhaustion, and possible destructiveness that the experience of double-
consciousness induces on the Black subject.  
It is not just that for Du Bois double consciousness can be a gift; it is that Du Bois’ very 
idea or critical concept of double consciousness is given to his readers as a gift—one that 
after a century, has kept on giving. Double-consciousness can be taken up and understood 
in very specific contexts, in the sense of the classic way Du Bois mentions of being Black 
(race/culture) and American (citizenship/culture). Questions pertaining to this 
understanding highlight the possibility of a uniqueness to double-consciousness as it 
pertains to Black Americans as opposed to the experience of Black French individuals or 
Indigenous peoples in America. In another way, there are many subtle ways that double-
consciousness can and has been adapted by Black scholars and Black artists (resulting in 
some of the most consumed literature, music and movies on the planet) which indicate 
some of the effect of racism towards Black people that is typically not addressed by 
institutions when attempting (if it is attempted) to create antiracist policies. Not only is 
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one looked on in “contempt and pity” by the larger white society but Blackness itself 
becomes posed as morally “dark”. The “twoness” that Du Bois describes emulates not 
only the “twoness” of the internal battle one faces but also the nature of duality itself, 
often contradictory. Thus the possibility of double-consciousness being a “gift” while at 
the same time being a destructive force can be held in the same breath.  
Du Bois does not refer to the particularity of being American and Black as to be 
exclusive, but rather to first and foremost relate this experience back to the self, and in 
many ways himself. While writing in a time only decades after the actual institution of 
slavery itself had ended, Du Bois was less removed from the ever-present material 
changes that needed to happen in order to gain equality for black Americans. He, 
however, faced incredible racism and struggled with finding his way as an “outsider” to 
the university. Still, his work does not dismiss the importance of theoretical changes that 
society needed to embrace in order to fully reconstruct after the period. Above I had 
drawn out some of Du Bois goals in Black Reconstruction in America (1935), but his 
retelling of the era is not all he sought to do. He also posed the question: “Just what did 
[slavery] mean to the owner and the owned?” (595). This question can be reframed in a 
number of ways, such as in terms of the colonised and colonizer, but the notion remains 
the same. His posing of these questions of identity, especially in his early work, serves as 
a way of uniting all American (or not) Black “folk” who share the experiences he 
describes. In addition to this, however, his work is in line with the goals with Rabaka 
outlined: addressing where the collective current cultural and personal perspectives stand, 
to hopefully not promote racialized (or any oppressed, for that matter) people to become 
comfortable with a lower standard of living. This idea, that Du Bois felt was already 
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occurring, was iterated earlier in The Souls of Black Folk, in Du Bois’ discussion of 
Booker T. Washington:  
Mr. Washington represents in Negro thought the old attitude of adjustment and 
submission…. Mr. Washington’s programme naturally takes an economic cast, 
becoming a gospel of Work and Money to such an extent as apparently almost 
completely to overshadow the higher aims of life…Mr. Washington’s programme 
practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races (47).  
Much of current scholarship and public thought may not agree with Booker T. 
Washington’s spirit of complacency that he embraces, and is criticized for by Du Bois. 
Yet this attitude is even more at risk of being spread, in some ways, today than in the era 
of Reconstruction or in the era of Du Bois, since modernity and technological advances 
as well increased discussion of racialized issues and racism provide a false sense of 
progress and change. Rather than returning to the root, rather than asking what slavery, 
what racism, what identity truly is, these issues are left to boil under the surface until the 
façade of normalcy is blown over and radicalism prevails. Double consciousness allows 
one to withstand this ambiguity, which is uncomfortable, until the issue is resolved.  
In this supposedly “post-racial” society, the conversation about race is focused mainly on 
cultural and social aspects rather than some inherent biological difference. Race becomes 
an idealized notion and value system, something that is noted by Sarah Ahmed in her 
article “Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness” (2007). While herself a 
contemporary British scholar, like Gilroy, her work resonates with experiences 
connecting all racialized people and one could connect the goal of multiculturalism 
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across all Western nations and also the resistance to multiculturalism. In this article, 
Ahmed connects the affect of “happiness” to the ideal of “multiculturalism” and the way 
in which this actually can lead to opposite of both of these goals. More importantly, 
Ahmed questions happiness as a goal. She begins by using happiness as a kind of 
standard of the Western world; and in claiming a “crisis” of happiness as a need to return 
to certain values. To understand what is behind such a “crisis of happiness” she explains 
there “is the belief that happiness should be an effect of following social ideals, almost as 
if happiness is the reward for a certain loyalty” (Ahmed 2007). By using examples from 
media where a community is happy when its inhabitants are similar to one another, and 
“unhappy” when they are different and unable to overcome those differences, Ahmed’s 
theory demonstrates the need for everything, complex relationships between groups of 
people who have complex histories to be solved with immediacy to fulfill the desire for 
instant gratification. She writes: 
The demand for happiness is what makes those histories disappear or projects 
them onto others, by seeing them as a form of melancholia (you hold onto 
something that is already gone) or even as a paranoid fantasy. These histories 
have not gone: we would be letting go of that which persists in the present, a 
letting go which would keep those histories present (Ahmed 2007).  
The importance of history is once again reiterated in this quote, in which Ahmed 
criticizes the premise of “happiness” and presents the opposing resistance to “live in the 
past”. The idea of slavery as an event of the past fits into this idea, and the act of 
forgetting it is a luxury only awarded to non-racialized persons.  
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In the scenario described by Ahmed, it is clear that homogeneity is desired to create what 
is known as “happiness”. If part of the goal of multiculturism is for these communities to 
live in “peace and harmony” it is seems to be predicated on the idea that those who come 
from outside whichever the dominating culture is (e.g.. an immigrant to England) are 
expected to experience “double consciousness” in a way that does not disturb the 
overriding population. They are able to experience elements of their identity which do not 
cause conflict and therefore “unhappiness”. However, it seems intrinsic in the very idea 
of “double consciousness” that the fractured element, of not feeling fully one identity or 
the other, can never fully be “smoothed” out.  
Ahmed’s example of the “demand for happiness” is relevant in other ways too—even 
ones pertaining to the United States. Du Bois utilizes the ideas of “fictions” in the same 
way to show an attempt to create a universal vision for white subjects. These fictions, as 
mentioned, are rooted in both capitalist and racist ideals, both not delivering on the 
promise of “equality” posed in the Declaration of Independence. The problem is not only 
that in citing “All men are created equal” originally clearly excluded certain groups, but 
then continuing to expect that after each milestone, whether the ending of slavery, or the 
end of Jim Crow laws, that this promise was somehow both finally starting at that 
moment and yet consistent all along.  
Du Bois’ idea of double consciousness does more than recognize the tensions in such 
contradictions in ideology. Whitman’s figure of the (white) body as the soul and the 
freedom to conquer oneself become paramount to the American ideals found in the 
Declaration of Independence. The tensions between American-ness and Blackness that 
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places the two at odds at the level of soul implies that at the root of  what it means to be 





Chapter 2  
2 Adapting Double Consciousness as Fragmented by 
Colonial Narratives Through Frantz Fanon 
2.1 Introduction 
To reiterate an idea from Chapter One, The Souls Of Black Folk is not easily definable as 
a genre, for Du Bois focuses on telling the narrative of many American figures, locations, 
and events always in relation to slavery and the quality of life for Black Americans. By 
doing so, the text’s very existence allows this history—the story of Du Bois’ life and 
many other Black writers —to formulate a kind of legacy in the same way that so many 
works of American white writers—such as Whitman’s Leaves of Grass—has become. 
The Souls Of Black Folk responds to the classic American idea of “Manifest Destiny” 
with a new idea that justice for black Americans is not just a civil right, but a spiritual 
fulfillment. However, because the United States was not the only country that took part in 
the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, a global understanding of this history and culture was 
important to DuBois.  Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) lived in a different geographical context 
and time period than Du Bois yet still utilized the idea of “double consciousness” in the 
analysis of his lived experience as a man from Martinique living in postwar France in 
Black Skins, White Masks (1952). “Double consciousness” became integral to his study of 
colonial violence as a whole, not limited to a particular country or group. While Fanon’s 
work is written about his unique experience, deeply French in many ways, he utilizes 
different disciplines and schools of thought from many cultures to explain his unique 
lived experience of being of African and European descent, applying their insights to 
broader ideas of blackness as constitutive of a general notion of the human condition. 
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I will be building upon Du Bois’ idea of “two-ness” (“two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings”), taking the “two-ness” out of its original context of race and 
citizenship (Du Bois 9). In some ways, Du Bois’ “two-ness”, of feeling both American 
and Black, means that these two souls are based on concepts (i.e. citizenship and race) 
which have colonial ties, their meaning reflecting deeply encoded premises that are racist. 
Still, Du Bois’ conception of double-consciousness is relevant as a tool with which to 
approach the experience of subsequent generations in the African diaspora. However, 
since Du Bois’ time the world has only become, in many ways, more fragmented with the 
rise of global capitalism, which has had an enormous impact on racialized peoples, 
especially Black Americans. More examples of this impact will be discussed further in 
the chapter. However, the economic benefits to nations such as the United States from 
this globalization of capitalism was of course closely tied to the system of slavery. In this 
chapter, using Frantz Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks to approach broader 
geographical contexts and colonialism as a whole, I hope to explore the idea that the 
“two”-ness of double-consciousness does not necessarily have to mean a complete 
splitting of identity (an inert non-relation of the two souls). I present a fragmented 
version of double-consciousness which would pertain to only a certain element or certain 
elements of a person’s identity. I derive this version of double-consciousness from 
Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks, and relate it back to the American context through 
Richard’s Wright 1940 novel Native Son. These texts reflect on the causes and operations 
of this partial double-consciousness living in not only the visible realm but in the 
intangible—and how these two are fundamentally related.  
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2.2 Fanon and The Violence of Colonial Identities  
Frantz Fanon’s work, similar to work the of Du Bois, draws upon different sources from 
a variety of historical and philosophical contexts. While situating Du Bois’ work in 
relation to the accepted views of his time may help to demonstrate the root of why he 
posed things a certain way, Fanon’s attempt to deal with his own unconscious views 
means one may use different frames of references. To help better organize a few of the 
ideas that are present in Fanon’s work in relation to double consciousness, it helps to see 
a few kinds of dualism in the attitudes Fanon subtly describes. Firstly, there is a kind of 
split already discussed first discussed by Du Bois, one that differentiates between one’s 
nationality and ethnicity. The other dualisms are less tangible and therefore less visible, 
but the work of Fanon demonstrates how they are all still as psychologically and socially 
isolating. One kind of fragmentation is that of a moral kind: described as “dark and light” 
by Fanon, a contradiction of being considered to be morally inferior (i.e. inherently 
violent) while simultaneously as being at the receiving end of various kinds of violence. 
Tied directly to this kind of moral consciousnesses leads into a focal split for Fanon’s 
thought: the age-old dualism of subject versus object, at times referred to in different 
contexts as the “master versus slave” dialectic. Another may be by way of polarizing 
affect, both in having certain affects projected onto the subject (the “contempt and pity” 
brought up by Du Bois) and the experiencing of affects (such as the ones in Native Son 
discussed later on).   
To begin bridging these various dualisms and their ultimate effect on double 
consciousness, the conversation of nationality is inevitable. Fanon, having and writing 
about preconceived ideas of Europe and America, already contributes to the analogy of 
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utilizing Black movements through these spaces as all part of the same system.  While 
much of this chapter focuses on one of Fanon’s early works, Black Skins, White Masks 
which was written in 1952, a later work of his, The Wretched of the Earth (written in 
1961) is also one of his most widely read texts. The preface to this later work was written 
by Fanon’s friend and mentor, Jean-Paul Sartre, whose notion of objectivity I will 
critique below. Sartre’s preface jousts with particular white readers who assume Fanon’s 
goal as seeking revenge for the injustice of racism (9). Sartre retorts, “Fanon has nothing 
in for you at all; he speaks often of you, never to you” (10). The “you” that is referred to 
signals a larger idea that Fanon builds throughout the book and finally in the conclusion. 
He writes that his idea of Europe is one that “undertook leadership of the World with 
ardour, cynicism, and violence” (311). Instead of seeing the United States as an 
opposition to European oppression and values, he argues the following. He poses the 
United States as a “former European colony” that decided to “catch up with Europe” and 
that it inevitably “succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster 
in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity or Europe have grown to appalling 
dimensions” (313). For Fanon, the “newness” of the American identity consists of the 
negative traits of Europe chronically magnified. If this is true, then Fanon’s conception of 
Europe and America can be used to deepen the connections of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade. However, if Fanon’s work addresses the effects of racialized violence on the 
consciousness of the one that experiences it, then it is not enough to see just his 
conception of the United States but include his conception of European anti-Black 
violence as well. In the chapter “The Black Man and Psychopathology” from Black Skins, 
White Masks, Fanon writes: 
32 
 
In the United States the Black man fights and is fought against. There are laws 
that gradually disappear from the constitution. There are other laws that prohibit 
certain forms of discrimination. And we are told that none of this is given 
free…For the Black Frenchman, the situation is unbearable. Unsure whether the 
white man considered him as consciousness in itself-for-itself, he is constantly 
preoccupied with detecting resistance, opposition and contestation. (154) 
His comments here are not only in reference to political differences between the United 
States and France, as Fanon’s book arrives at the dawn of the civil rights movement in 
the United States, as well as at a time when France was still holding many colonies at the 
precursor to the Algerian War of Independence in 1954. Besides the political and social 
difference between the two nations in this quote, they also become symbolic 
representations between subject-object relations. It is the way he seems to be describing 
various kinds of splits in a person’s psyche—usually an embodied as a racialized 
person—that manifests as forms of double consciousness, that perhaps do not completely 
overpower one’s identity, but alters at least some part of it under certain circumstances.   
For a moment I will ponder Fanon’s idea of what it means to be unsure of being 
considered as “consciousness in itself-for-itself” pertaining to the burden of the French 
Black man. I will borrow terminology from a classic philosopher who plays an important 
role in Black existentialist schools of thought (for reasons discussed in this chapter and 
Chapter 3), Søren Kierkegaard. He writes the following in The Sickness Unto Death 
(1849):   
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The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation 
[which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self…Man is a 
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom 
and necessity, in short he is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two 
factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self. (qtd. Peredoom & Guignon 78) 
Kierkegaard’s conception of man and his fundamental constitution as stated here is a 
paradox; and is in many ways humorously and purposefully convoluted.  In the history of 
philosophy, the “spirit” is often considered the “free” part of the soul, which tradition 
Kierkegaard recognizes when he proclaims man is born to be “free”. On the other hand, a 
person is bound to a large extent by their particulars: where they are born, what gender 
they are, their class positionality, religion and so forth. Somewhere between the struggle 
between the “finite” and “infinite” elements of a person is that person’s true self. Feeding 
too much into one side or the other can cause a person to be in a state of “despair” 
(anxiety) which is the “sickness” itself. Borrowing this framework, I will look at various 
examples Fanon provides in which there appears to be a kind of disruption to a person’s 
“relation to the self”. 
The first example of a thing which disrupts a person’s self-relation is language, which is 
the focus of the first chapter of Black Skins, White Masks. Fanon begins the book on the 
topic of language which sets the tone for how important language is; not only in the 
establishment of a person’s identity but also for its capacity to be weaponized as a tool 
for racial violence. He writes:  
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All colonized people—in other words people in whom an inferiority complex has 
taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave—
position themselves in relation to the civilizing language. (2) 
He goes on then to describe the frustrating phenomena of the constant scrutiny he faces, 
as a person originating French colony to the mainland, regarding how he speaks and what 
he says. For Fanon, it becomes apparent that colonized people (whether Black, 
Indigenous or otherwise people of colour) are never truly accepted, no matter how much 
or little they integrate – and they face this from not only people from the “civilizing” land 
but also from their place of origin, as they no longer fit there either. This experience, of 
course, is not specific to those from previously colonized nations but applicable for the 
experience of immigration in general. Language is thus used in this way as a measure to 
determine a person’s intelligence or status, further categorizing an individual into a 
certain social standing. If a displaced person loses some of their native tongue while 
learning a new language and is isolated from both then it can be stated that this conflict of 
languages is another form of double-consciousness.  
Fanon alludes to an example of how many young men from Martinique sought to gain 
expertise on French literature or philosophy, in the “hope their blackness will be 
forgotten” (170). The creation of a French colony (Martinique) instilled the idea of racial 
superiority and cultural superiority, as an extension, which asserts the notion that 
“becoming more French” is the only way to rise within the social hierarchy. Yet these 
observations came only after Fanon had moved away from Martinique, upon joining the 
French Free forces in the war, to live in France. This relocation made the experience of 
the oppression of occupation in Martinique at the beginning of the war to the anti-black 
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racism in France pivotal in shaping his views. But before this moment, as suggested in 
the way Fanon describes life in Martinique and in tandem with Isaac Julien’s 1996 
documentary, Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask, people in Martinique largely did 
not relate to other people of African or Arab descent [36:00-36:32]. Fanon was one of the 
first people to articulate on these relations exposing the internalization of colonial 
attitude, turning his back in some ways on the country he had once fought for (France) to 
seek liberation for all nations that had been colonized [36:32-37:02].  
Fanon dedicates a chapter of Black Skin, White Masks to the matter of “The Black Man 
and Language”, arguing about the entanglement of language and colonialism, and once 
again invoking the tension between subject and object relations, disguised as tensions 
between subjectivities. The Martinique subject views themselves in terms of their French-
ness and ability to adapt French culture, whereas when in France these markers of status 
are erased by skin colour. Upon relocating in France, Fanon finds himself constantly 
subject to slurs that demean him, but instead (or in addition to) fearing for his life in the 
face of these verbal assaults, Fanon articulates the constant fear of wondering if others 
see him as “consciousness in itself-for-itself” like themselves. 
But the issue is not about convincing subjects that one kind of literature or language is 
superior, rather in positing that the idea of French-ness becoming a moral issue rather 
than a culture one. What makes the use of this moral coding so powerful is not only the 
split it causes in Fanon, but also the feelings of guilt, shame, and fear that are invoked in 
him. Fanon writes in Chapter Six, “The Black Man and Psychopathology”: 
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Moral consciousness implies a kind of split, a fracture of consciousness between a 
dark and light side. Moral standards require the black, the dark and the black man 
to be eliminated from this consciousness. A black man, therefore, is constantly 
struggling against his own image. (170) 
Fanon uses strict dichotomy between “light” and “dark” to demonstrate how strict 
categories of what is acceptable determine how the Black man becomes overdetermined 
as a “symbol of sin”, which is nothing more than  a scapegoat for white guilt (170-174). 
The way that this moral consciousness came to place the Black man as an image of the 
“dark side” in European imagery, and the various forms of this scapegoating takes shape 
(especially in light of modernity) is discussed further in Chapter 3. For now, I would like 
to focus on how this conception of weaponizing morality replaces the self-relation 
constitutive of the self in existentialist philosophy with a “non-relation” as outlined in 
Fanon’s critique. He scrutinizes how the transformation of the Black man into the 
“symbol of sin” in European consciousness causes a fetishistic fixation on that Black 
body—as that which is forbidden, and the different implications of this, i.e. sexual. On 
page 174, he continues to describe how for the Black man himself, he begins to see 
himself as belonging to this “dark” side as well, resulting in a kind of double 
consciousness—either wanting to be seen or not seen as “Black”. If one accepts their 
blackness as inherently evil, they seek to confirm it (174). More than this, in recognizing 
the absurdity of these two options, which are not truly options at all, the awareness of this 
type of double consciousness holds a great power. He seems to suggest that in rejecting 
these two paths deemed acceptable, one has no choice but to gain a certain deeper level 
of understanding of the “universal” (174). Alluding to the idea of the master and slave 
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dialectic rooted in Hegel’s idealism, Fanon refers to the potential of this power, which has 
the ability to “shake the foundations of the world” (175). However, this comes at the 
radical cost of the “self-destruction” of the Black man, who seems to fall in a “black 
hole” (175). What is meant by Fanon in this idea becomes apparent in works of literature 
such as Richard Wright’s Native Son, which I will discuss later in the chapter and again 
in Chapter Three. The trope is played out all too often in non-fiction, highlighted in 
recent incidents of police brutality towards black victims, and the BIPOC people who 
have sparked movements and protests against it. To put the conversations of racial 
injustices back on the table only comes at the cost of a life. Using such a form of double 
consciousness as a phenomenological model shows that how an individual views 
themselves is more than an issue of identity, more than the perceived feeling of being an 
“outsider”. In Du Bois’ conception of double consciousness, the conflict comes when one 
“ever feels his twoness” of being both American and Black (Du Bois 9). This definition 
sets the stage for the possibility of synthesis with Fanon’s ideas about blackness and 
moral consciousness. If so much of what it means to be “American” is encoded in 
premises of antiblackness then one is always in opposition to him or herself. Du Bois 
asserts the point that it is not about feeling American in certain instances or feeling Black 
in others, but rather to engage with the experiences of feeling both tensions as a fact of 
lived reality.  
Returning to the idea of colonial relations as a whole, Fanon draws on his experiences 
growing up in Martinique alongside those of his later experiences in Algeria during the 
French occupation. Similar to Du Bois’ prioritization of the period after slavery, as in his 
critical analysis of Reconstruction, Fanon focuses on the period after independence. As a 
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psychiatrist, Fanon was able to work not only with victims of torture in Algeria during 
the war, but the French soldiers responsible for committing acts of violence towards local 
Algerians. Prior to this time, his birthplace, Martinique gained independence from France 
in 1946—the midpoint of his life and during the time of his work. His treatment of the 
psyches damaged variously by colonial violence was predicated upon the physicality of 
power struggle during the war, which created seemingly irreversible, lasting damage on 
the dispositions of those in the front lines. Here, one can begin to draw other links 
between other forms of colonialism and slavery besides physical violence that can be 
further used to understand Fanon’s work.  As Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe 
writes in his 2019 book Necropolitics, regarding the effects of colonialism, “colonial 
wars were wars of extraction and predation”. For Mbembe, the process of colonialism 
entails “entire peoples labor[ing] under the apprehension that the resources for continuing 
to assume their identities are spent” (2-4).  Mbembe refers to the system of colonial rule 
and struggle for power as largely dependent on exploiting the land and human population 
already inhabiting it for resources of a certain kind. More than this, however, the 
exploitation of people for commodities is made possible by a re-alignment of identity. 
The group being exploited becomes complicit in the degradation of their land thus 
forcing the exploitation to become a part of their identity. Mbembe’s conception of 
colonial violence alludes to not only the physical force of violence but methods that also 
change one’s conception of self. 
The psychological and physical violence Fanon saw and scrutinized in the Algerian war 
took place during the same time that residential schools were open and operating in their 
peak in Canada, across the Atlantic ocean—over four hundred years since Europeans first 
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set foot in Indigenous territory. Over half a century later, Indigenous scholars have 
articulated the way in which this history still is pervasive in contemporary Canadian 
identity. In Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada (2015), Emma 
Lowman and Adam J. Barker, seeks to disassociate the notion that nations like Canada or 
Australia became decolonized when they separated from England (25). Settler 
colonialism explicates the phenomenon of claiming power for local governing bodies at 
the expense of denying the sovereignty of Indigenous populations. Lowman and Barker 
say the following about settler colonialism: 
We can say that when they move to new places, settlers carry their sovereignty 
with them and then after selecting a place to live, justify asserting sovereignty—
their power of governance over that territory—through narratives of progress and 
superiority. (25) 
The colonizer creates a “new” identity for themselves, based on the sovereignty they 
assert in their assumed dominant relation to the Indigenous population. The idea of 
superiority, which will be discussed shortly, whether speaking to a notion of superiority 
of race, religion, culture, or language, is not born purely from ignorance or hatred but is 
also a necessity—a premise of power that guarantees survival and a legacy of 
sovereignty. It should be also noted in this argument, that the idea of sovereignty in 
colonialism gets removed from any inherent “claim” or history with the land. The notion 
of sovereignty, as well as the premise that land can be claimed and exploited for 
instrumental use, is settler baggage wholly divorced from the ancestral ties and cultural 
traditions associated with the land before their arrival. 
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Lowman and Barker argue that in its final form settler colonialism “transcends” itself—in 
other words, it becomes a pervasive and integral presupposition on which its society is 
built, “naturalized, normalized, unquestioned and unchallenged” (26). This is maintained 
by conveying history in a way that emphasizes or downplays certain events to look 
favourable to the colonizer (26). The same kind of transcendence is attempted with 
Slavery as well; as elaborated upon in the widespread teaching of the Dunning school’s 
view on the period of Reconstruction mentioned in Chapter One. One could argue that in 
North America, this transcendence has exceeded itself; prime ministers make public 
apologies for infractions against Indigenous populations, many schools, universities and 
even churches utilize public land acknowledgment of tradition Indigenous lands and so 
forth. These are all passive ways of relieving settler guilt, all the while refusing to 
question the very roles these institutions have played in the subjugation of Indigenous 
populations (or take the questioning further, translating it into the action of dismantling 
and replacing those institutions). That does not mean that these practices are ill-
intentioned; however they do aid the further continuation of the settler colonial legacy by 
being restricted to mere speech; that of a performance of reparation suited to satisfy 
settler but not Indigenous needs. The idea of settler colonialism is especially dangerous 
inasmuch as covert ways of racism prevail in the controlling of language. The social and 
economic devastation a nation like Algeria faced after gaining independence from France 
is not necessarily more or less destructive than settler colonialism as described by 
Lowman and Barker. However, the persistent attitudes necessary to perpetuate settler 
colonialism, which are allowed to fully develop and ripen into transcendent forms, the 
colonizer’s psyche.  
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In the American context, the idea of settler colonialism (and manifestations of 
colonialism) is complicated by the system of slavery in a way many other countries do 
not endure. Black slaves were forced to take part in the extraction and cultivation process 
of the land, all the while facing the same structure of dehumanization as Indigenous 
populations under liberal notions of “superiority and progress” that Lowman and Barker 
mention. The paradox of being an integral part of the new sovereignty of the land, yet 
that sovereignty and power belonging to someone else with no room to overlap, may be 
considered to be a major factor in explaining the “two soul-ness” element of double-
consciousness, as opposed to the less fully split experience. While there was a war for 
“independence” in America, it was not between the local inhabitants and colonizers that 
framed the settlers as victims of oppression from the mainland. This allows for a split 
consciousness to occur where the oppressed and oppressors are both white and of 
European descent, and the oppression of Black and Indigenous populations in North 
America deliberately remains undetected. Now that the paradigm of defining oppression 
has been shifted, the “oppression” of white North Americans—while still holding 
sovereignty of the land in many, is focused on by a great margin, and has given rise to the 
new fascism of white identity politics. This plays into the identity of settlers as they 
formed the ideals of a “new” nation instead of returning to the mainland. Instead of 
recognizing the trauma of the colonized nation, the memory must constantly evolve as 
Lowman and Barker state to transcend and continue sovereignty—implying it is still 
present. It is possible that this literal presence pertains also to the legacy of slavery—
which is important to arguments such as those by Afro-pessimists which I will be 
discussing in Chapter Three.  
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What Lowman and Barker call “narrative” pertains to the notion that a certain individual 
or collective is allowed to hold ideas that do not contradict their fundamental beliefs 
while benefitting from actions that contradict what they espouse. Already Fanon 
demonstrates the power of moral consciousness on one (“the Black man”) who has been 
made out to be a “symbol of sin”. Now, I turn to look more specifically at some of the 
factors that create this “narrative”. Explicit attempts to see the historical and cultural 
images of a certain group as inferior is not the only means of justifying oppression. As a 
doctor of psychiatry, Fanon often uses examples of his peers both in the past and present 
using to ruminate on this premise. As he writes in just one example:  “In all seriousness 
they have been rinsing out their test tubes adjusting their scales and have begun research 
on how the wretched black man could whiten himself” (Fanon 91). The mid-century 
scientists Fanon were referring to were not trying to prove blackness was a “bodily curse” 
but they had already accepted it and were working off this premise (91). As noted by 
Raymond Williams in his 1983 edition of Keywords: A Culture and Society, the entry for 
the word “racial” contains the idea of races presupposed by the categories of as used 
originally in “classificatory biology” (Williams 249). It operated by differentiating 
groups within a certain species, and specifically the human species, in order to denote 
characteristics of certain groups defined as racial markers (Williams 249).  Although 
there today there may be ethical codes against the kinds of experiments Fanon mentions, 
and the word “race” or “racial” has evolved in common usage, so as to perpetuate racist 
premises in a detrimental way. In his 2012 book Black and Blue: The Origins of and 
Consequences of Medical Racism, John Hoberman uses historical medical records to 
illuminate the racist perceptions of black patients in the United States from the early 20th 
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century onwards. An example of one of these perceptions is the widespread belief among 
doctors that that Black patient’s illnesses were largely “self-inflicted” (Hoberman 21). He 
states that many of the negative connotations surrounding Black patients are actively held 
by doctors today, whether subconsciously or not. While he argues that this is part of a 
great inequality in service available between the quality of healthcare for Black 
Americans being much lower than that of white Americans, this is not the of crux his 
argument. He continues, that though these journals changed the racist tone of their 
writing, by acknowledging the discrepancies in medical care, most point to “sociological” 
factors as the cause, without much enthusiasm for solving the problem (23). Furthermore, 
the lack of healthcare is a compounded effect of poverty and a mistrust of the medical 
system, which are important factors in considering these issues. Hoberman’s work goes 
further than stating what contemporary medical journals seem to be content with by 
describing the phenomenological reality of the medical community regards to healthcare 
inequality. He observes a kind of splitting of consciousness employed to keep the 
accepted paradigm of medicine—to borrow the words of Lowman and Barker—
"naturalized, normalized, unquestioned and unchallenged.” 
The way that this status quo is maintained by the medical community, as described by 
Hoberman, is a microcosmic indication of how other kinds of bodies continue to operate 
under certain narratives. He points out a disconnect between, as mentioned, the medical 
community’s attempt at acknowledgement and understanding of some of the issues that 
cause medical inequality. As Hoberman writes:  
The medical literature’s response to overwhelming evidence of racially biased 
(and potentially deadly) behaviors has thus combined two strategies. On the one 
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hand, there are the hundreds of peer-reviewed reports of racially differential 
diagnosis and treatment. At the same time, the presentation of these data employs 
a rhetoric of alibis, euphemism, and denial. The purpose of these rhetorical 
strategies is to demonstrate that, regardless of what the statistical evidence says 
about their behavior, American physicians are not “racists” who require 
reformation or public exposure. (41) 
Hoberman uses this contrast of “strategies”, not in order to critique individuals doctors 
themselves, but rather to disclose the great lengths that medical institutions go to in order 
to, as he says, create “alibis”. One method of argument is to locate sociological factors as 
the sole reason for their outcomes, and another is to emphasize the “busyness” of doctors 
that force them to rely on impersonal stereotyping for their diagnoses (41-42). However. 
Hoberman makes the claim that the medical community willfully chooses to deny taking 
into account the medical history of racism so that it may concede to a kind of medical 
“agnosticism” (44). What Hoberman means by this term, is a refusal to take an 
unambiguous stance on the cause of certain medical discrepancies caused by racial bias. 
There have been acknowledgments of bias and a need to better understand the 
relationships between patients and doctors, but as Hoberman notes, this has mostly lead 
to a cyclical argument of “we need to understand more about what we don’t understand” 
(42). The kind of denial described by Hoberman is not limited to medicine and the points 
Hoberman makes about medicine, but certainly applicable to other branches of scientific 
and humanistic thought such as history, philosophy, anthropology, psychology and so 
forth. Hoberman’s thesis in this chapter is that all of these tactics for “denial” are in 
actuality about not wanting to take responsibility for the unresolved issues of the past. 
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His research discloses a fundamental inability on the part of the medical institution to 
face its colonial roots and colonial language. Furthermore, a capitalist society prioritizes 
the quantity of working time over the consideration that this pushes workers into a state 
of anxiety and apathy about their work. This creates a culture of efficiency (as opposed to 
effectiveness) associated with doctors facing time constraints and therefore the inability 
to address their own biases. This is not entirely the fault of the members of the medical 
community, but Hoberman argues that these time constraints are relished as hallmarks of 
medicine and part of the larger cultural understanding of what it means to be a doctor. As 
shown by Hoberman in this book, the condoned negligence used to decide which issues 
are worth the medical community’s time and efforts and are not without consequence 
(which potentially mirrors the same habits of other institutions) directly resulting in the 
physical and mental harm of Black patients.  
2.3 Discourse on the Projection of Morality as Racism  
Now that the effects of having unchallenged attitudes in the institutional setting of 
contemporary medicine have been elaborated upon, it beckons us to consider the 
motivation behind these attitudes and why they came to be so necessary to maintaining 
the paradigm of Western science. One common thread in the underlying narrative in both 
colonialism itself and the specificities of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and African 
diaspora is Fanon’s idea of inferiority and superiority. The idea of superiority is referred 
to by Lowman and Barker also mentioned as a key idea in recycling the settler colonial 
narrative. In Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1946 book The Anti-Semite and the Jew, the topic of 
hatred in the form of racism is looked at more broadly rather than in the particular scope 
of colonialism. Sartre’s insights, which were important to Fanon, shed light on the 
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inferiority and superiority complex integral to these relations of racial animosity. He 
writes: “The anti-Semite has chosen hate because hate is a faith…He tries simply to 
project his intuitive certainty onto the plane of discourse” (20). It is interesting that Sartre 
uses Kierkegaard’s term, faith, to describe the experience of hatred. He mostly uses the 
term in the context of his ideology of “good” and “bad” faith, yet this application still 
constitutes the idea of putting one’s belief in something unfounded (intuition). He then 
goes on to describe the anti-Semite as having a certain kind of freedom or “right to play” 
(20).  He claims that the racist or anti-Semite does not even necessarily fully believe in 
their hatred. Or, to some extent, Sartre claims that a part of the anti-Semite or racist 
person finds their hatred at least somewhat ridiculous, and when confronted may not even 
defend their point of view (20).  Someone who can freely assert anti-Semitic claims 
reflects their privilege to amuse themselves with “eccentric” views. The colonizer, 
however, relies too heavily upon the resources of the colonized—whether it be their land, 
labour power, or commodities—to have the luxury of throwing discourse around for pure 
entertainment.  The dissonance between the anti-Semite’s views and Jewish identity does 
not necessarily need to assert itself in such an obtuse manner for the “bad faith” of the 
position to be seen. Medical researchers see a racial bias, have access to the racist history 
of medicine to see results repeated throughout history patients which entail Black patients 
receiving worse treatment or dying more frequently from certain causes, yet they are 
institutionally compelled to claim ignorance about the cause. As Hoberman suggested, 
this refusal take a leap in concluding that responsibility on behalf of the medical 




Sartre may describe the person who is already well into believing they are superior and 
we have seen some of the ongoing historic and cultural messages that contribute to such 
beliefs. Yet still, his account of this complex only takes them as attitudes or feelings at 
face value, describing a scenario of the anti-Semite as a person of privilege, but also a 
person subject to their emotional whims. Additionally, anti-Semitism in this context that 
Sartre would have witnessed occurs internally in the country. Antiblack racism occurs in 
this context but also between nations. Fanon comments more on this relationship in 
Chapter 5 of Black Skins, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of the Black Man”, 
suggesting that antiblack racism cannot be reduced to a kind “faith” to which person 
chooses to engage in. “The plane of discourse” to which the anti-Semite chooses to 
project onto implies a kind of neutral zone to which all kinds of perspectives exist. What 
Fanon implies is that the plane itself has shifted to a place where due to incredible 
violence, the language of articulating blackness and antiblackness is hardly in the same 
realm of discourse.  He discusses some of the horrors discovered as he read about 
colonialism in African nations (and uses Sartre’s analysis of the anti-Semite at times to 
do so). In reaction to Sartre he writes: " A feeling of inferiority? No a feeling of not 
existing. Sin is black as virtue is white. All those white men, fingering their guns, can’t 
be wrong” (118). In this quote, Fanon moves beyond the idea of being superior or 
inferior—which may be the easiest way to conceptualize racial issues. But in fact, this 
affiliation extends to the black subject not as feeling like an inferior subject at all, but an 
object. Once again the double consciousness to two forms of subjecthood now becomes a 
distinction divorced from the concept of subjectivity itself. 
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The colonizers (or those who benefit from such values) not only seek to maintain 
supremacy over the oppressed group, but rather, are compelled to create a new narrative 
erasing much of the oppressed group’s existence. Determining cultural practices as 
barbaric, or rewriting scientific definitions of races to assert them as less human creates a 
new set of “facts”—and as we have seen previously, of morality. Fanon, as a psychiatrist, 
intentionally uses the analogy of “Sin” over any other negative adjective because of the 
commanding relationship many readers (mainly being Christian) have to the idea of 
Sin—a festering and deep-seated fear.  
Thus, as Fanon implies here the colonizing group “can’t be wrong”, not only because 
they have the use of violence, but they claim to have the force of God on their side. The 
use of religion implies a kind of “bad faith” wherein white subjects may not even truly 
believe that their religion justifies racism. But in doing so they project their guilt and 
disavow their own “darkness” onto Black bodies. As Fanon reminds us: “A normal black 
child, having grown up with a normal family, will become abnormal at the slightest 
contact with the white world” (122). This “abnormality” occurs in being subjected to 
these contradictory notions that were created specifically to push aside the inherent 
contradictions of being. In other words, when the default of whiteness is always used, no 
matter the country or time, blackness always becomes an anomaly. While Fanon uses his 
own experience to demonstrate his “otherness”, often in very blatant ways, it is the ways 
that seem to transcend being obvious which appear to hurt the most.  
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2.4 Double Consciousness Through Affect in Richard 
Wright’s Native Son 
In Black Skins, White Masks Fanon makes reference to a character named Bigger 
Thomas, a fictional character from Richard Wright’s 1940 novel Native Son. This novel, 
which sets its narrative in 1930s Chicago, would have been a new release just prior to the 
time Fanon wrote. Fanon is clearly moved by Native Son and the character of Bigger; he 
references him in such a personal way, as if he is a familiar person. As much as Bigger is 
a fictional character, he is also used by Fanon as a figure of fate. His tragic story bridges 
his character to a specific and particular to a time and place, but also in such a way that 
he becomes an immortalized archetypal. In the opening scene of the novel, Wright 
skillfully uses naturalism to achieve the goals of realism—a precedent that is kept 
throughout the novel. The opening scene of the book delves directly into the 
impoverished life and conditions of the Thomas family. Their living situation is a product 
of redlining (the systemic prevention of giving African Americans access to certain area 
of housing in cities)1, but Wright does not explain this right away. Instead, he gives a 
vivid description of the daily lives of the Thomas family. A summary of the scene is best 
described by Kadeshia L. Matthews in “Violence and the Flight form Blackness in 
Richard Wright’s Native Son”: 
The opening scene of Native Son immediately impresses us with the cramped, 
improper domesticity of the Thomas family. Even were Bigger inclined to use this 
 
1 See: Wiley-Blackwell. “The United States: One Century of Redlining.” Place, Exclusion, and Mortgage 
Markets, 2011, pp. 77–102 
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space as in antebellum literature, it is not one likely to be productive of any stable 
or complete identity. Mother, sons, and daughter all sleep, dress, cook, and eat in 
the same tiny room. The intrusion of the rat points to the apartment’s disrepair, as 
well as its unsanitary, dangerous condition. The narrowness of the Thomas’s 
room reflects the narrowness of their lives. Wright portrays the Thomas women as 
defeated, wanting nothing more from life than what whites are willing to offer. 
Mrs. Thomas, with her constant talk of death, seems old before her time. Her 
religion pacifies rather than inspires her; it teaches her to endure injustice rather 
than challenge it and to wait for a better world after death. Bigger perceives his 
sister, Vera, as a younger, less religious version of their mother, and whereas he 
has dreamed of flying planes, her highest ambition seems to be work as a 
seamstress. Even Buddy, who is feminized in relation to Bigger, strikes his older 
brother as “soft and vague . . . aimless, lost . . . like a chubby puppy” (108). The 
vagueness Bigger identifies in his family suggests their lack of will or purpose, of 
identity even. 
Through Matthew’s summary, it is easy to picture the implications of the Thomas’s 
family situation, how their financial situation bleakly reflects their mental states. Readers 
of Native Son are not brought to a period of the past, but are brought immediately to a 
present that transcendence culture or year. The reader gains a glimmer of hope when 
Bigger is offered a job from a wealthy white man including living in his home; it is at 
least a promise of a better material condition than his current one. The reader quickly 
realizes something that Bigger seems to know and accept all along; the “opportunities” he 
receives will never materialize into anything but space for condemnation, an extreme that 
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is realized in the eventual accusation leveled against him of the rape and murder of his 
bosses’ daughter, and of finally being sentenced to death at the end of the final chapter, 
which is bluntly called “Fate.”  
As much as Bigger is a fictional character, he is meant to represent any Black person 
living in a white supremacist society, a person whose first crime (or  perhaps “original 
sin”) was simply being Black. Though the story is much about Bigger, the reader actually 
feels distant to him—partially because Wright explicitly documents Bigger’s stunted 
character development as a result of his predicament. The result is a splitting and trapping 
of his consciousness between two states, the first being a perpetual state of ennui at the 
mundanity of a life where one is not able to pursue to much of anything and the second 
being a perpetual state of dread contemplating the inevitable violence to come. Bigger 
expresses his ennui in the novel when he and his friend, Gus, see Air Force pilots flying 
planes above, feeling a desire do the same, but reiterating how it will never be a 
possibility for them. Regarding this realization: “For a moment Bigger contemplated all 
the “ifs” that Gus had mentioned. Then both boys broke hard into laughter, looking at 
each through squinted eyes” (22-23). The boys laugh not because their desires are funny, 
but rather they laugh because to even entertain such a thought of an impoverished Black 
person in America working as a pilot seems ridiculous. The only way to deal with the 
harshness of the reality is to have a sense of humour. In the same conversation, Bigger 
mentions in the same conversation he feels like “nothing ever happens” yet at the same 
time he also reveals (in one of the few times we do get a look at Bigger’s thoughts and 
feelings) his strong feeling that something “awful” is going to happen to him (23-25). He 
is vague in stating this, but such ambiguity is precisely his reality, if the string of events 
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did not unfold the way they did in the book they could have unfolded in any number of 
ways with the same outcome as Bigger’s demise. 
The contrasting feelings of impending doom and perpetual boredom is reminiscent to the 
distinction that Walter Benjamin makes between two types of experience: Erfahrung (or 
long experience) and Erlebnis (or isolated/shock experience). Efrahrung is rooted in 
tradition, and something that connects the collective with the individual and enriches the 
individual while he or she is never removed from history2. Erlebnis is an isolated 
experience, taking place in a certain specific time and place in history but not connecting 
to anything else outside of itself.  In the modern world, says Benjamin, one continuously 
experiences a set of occurring “shocks”, each one further distancing themselves from 
each other. This is also the experience for racialized figures such as Fanon and Bigger 
Thomas. Fanon makes reference to several traumatizing personal anecdotes of being 
called racial slurs, such as the example he gives in the beginning of Chapter Five of Black 
Skins, White Masks being called the n-word, or encountering racist stereotypes such as 
the figure of Y a bon Banania mentioned throughout the text (Fanon 89). These events 
cause a constant state of traumatizing shock—disconnecting the individual from 
themselves and others, as they are kept in a state of high tensions and fear: an overdose of 
Erlebnis. In many ways these kinds of experience noted by Benjamin come out of taking 
up the work of poets, such as the 19th century French Charles Baudelaire to describe the 
newly industrialized world of life in cities, the vulgar shock experiences with growing 
 
2
 See Benjamin’s 1940 article “On the Theses of History” or 1939 article “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” 
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capitalism during this time period. Yet in order to adapt the distinction between Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung as it pertains to the experience of Bigger Thomas, one must take into 
account the essential part of slavery that involved disconnecting Black slaves from their 
homeland, children from families so it is difficult if not impossible to have a sense of 
heritage or ancestry.   
As Fanon notes, at the same time as being denied access to this history and cultural 
practices, access to a notion of identity is only given through a dominant white narrative 
which is the only allowable expression of this culture. For example, Fanon describes the 
feeling of feeling “responsible” not only for himself but for his “race” and his 
“ancestors”, along with “cannibalism, backwardness, fetishism, racial stigmas, slave 
traders, and above all, yes above all, the grinning Y a bon Banania” (92). Essentially any 
of the negative narratives used to oppress his ancestors replaces any of the positive 
narratives one can usually form about their history, family, or culture.  Although he is 
seeing himself as both “himself” alongside this racist lens, but is difficult to combat these 
negatives images without an ability to connect with one’s past for those forcibly removed 
from their heritage. 
The ultimate result of these two contrasting sensations is most likely despair, yet Fanon 
alludes to fear. About Native Son, he writes: 
It’s Bigger Thomas who is afraid but afraid of what? Of himself. We  
don’t yet know who is, but he knows that fear will haunt the world   
the world once the world finds out. (Fanon 118) 
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Not only does Fanon acknowledge that we never fully learn about who Bigger is (and he 
does not necessarily find out himself), but he is fully aware of the consequences his race 
has for him though Bigger himself does not carry this power. This is also reflected by 
Mbembe when he speaks of a person of colour’s constant need to justify their existence: 
“As a result, he fears showing himself such as he really is, preferring disguise and 
dissimulation to authenticity and convinced shame has been brought upon his existence.” 
(Mbembe 132). The ambiguity in the text makes it unknown whether the accusations 
against Bigger is true or not, but either way Bigger himself accepts that he is the 
murderer by the end.  
When the reader finally does come across Fanon’s reference to Native Son without 
reading the book they are likely to be confused for he writes with very little context: “In 
the end, Bigger Thomas acts. He acts to put an end to the tensions, he answers the 
world’s expectations” (Fanon 118). But in this short sentence alone, Fanon already 
bridges two ideas important for understanding Bigger’s fate (I believe, in a ironic way). 
Firstly, in reference Bigger Thomas acting in the end, he purposefully does not say 
exactly in what his action is, but in keeping with the ambiguity of the novel—he asserts 
that it does not matter. The murder could have been an accident or not, but Bigger was 
already “violent” before he was even given the choice. Fanon uses the idea of action here 
as a reference to his existentialist counterparts such as Sartre (and others like 
Kierkegaard) in which action is the primal expression of one’s fundamental freedom. 
However, throughout the novel Bigger’s ability to act is greatly restricted from lack of 
personal stimulation to a systemic lack of opportunities.  In such a way (Fanon critiques 
existentialism’s propensity to exclude embodied and stigmatized people. The way that 
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Bigger “acts” by accepting himself to be the murderer, and confirming his self- 
perception that he, as a Black man, is inherently violent, and that his fate is the only 
acceptable way Bigger could relate to white society.    
The end of the novel is still dissatisfying, as the reader is forced to want Bigger not to 
accept his fate and to side with the lawyer, who tries to help him get off. Max urges 
Bigger to not give into what the world tells him he is, and tries to get him to admit the 
structures in place created by those with the power to determine his predicament (Wright 
388-391). One gets the sense that Bigger is more aware of this than he leads on, but 
perhaps that route is too painful for him to pursue. Though Jewish himself, and the 
recipient of his fair share of racism, Max seems much more in tune with Bigger’s plight 
than the other characters, usually white, who seem to “sympathize” with black characters 
and try to “help” Bigger, all the while failing to their actions that add to the problem. 
While potentially well-intentioned whites try to take part in the “decolonization” 
process——whether it be public apologies, land acknowledgements, or even academics 
such as myself writing on this topic, Mbembe makes one thing clear: 
Violence pre-existed the advent of decolonization, which consisted in setting in 
motion an animated body able to completely and unreservedly deal that which, 
being anterior and external to it, prevented it from arriving at its concept. 
(Mbembe 6) 
Bigger “becoming” violent is not the problem, as “violence” itself is inherent to the 
situation of colonialism and racism. The reader’s desire for Bigger to see himself in a 
non-violent way, whether coming from a well-intentioned place or not, is still part of the 
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larger problem—it is to demand or assert control over the way a person sees themselves 
while simultaneously benefitting from the same society that was built upon the premise 
of their invisibility. While pondering the freedom to which a character like Bigger has, 
one notes how other characters, such as Bigger’s girlfriend, Bessie, are discarded of, 
unseen by the world and given no voice at all. While Max attempts to advocate for 
Bigger, a Black woman such as Bessie is allotted no form of justice at all, demonstrating 
the scale to which this oppression exists. While Bigger may have an appearance of choice 
in the novel, other characters do not have an appearance at all. 
In the next chapter, I look at the history of modernity as building these premises, 
allowing the violence towards Black folk to be brought into the present. Then, I look at 
the movement of Afro-pessimism which takes up this inherent presence of violence, 







Chapter 3  
3 Double Consciousness in the Legacy of Modernity 
In this final chapter, by once again taking a historic and theoretic approach, I discuss 
some factors in tracing the roots of ideas about Black consciousness. Positioning thinkers 
such as W.E.B. Du Bois in history and asking the question of what the significance of his 
or her legacy is, is more than a sociological query. One asks these questions recognizing 
that there is a fundamental issue with resolving problems with the current methodology 
that helped to create them. Paul Gilroy’s book The Black Atlantic (1993), introduced in 
Chapter One, both directly and indirectly takes up Du Bois work in the context of 
“modernity” and why concepts of this time period still haunt the current discourse on race 
theory. The first chapter of this paper considered double consciousness as a product of 
Du Bois’ legacy, a “gift” that ultimately holds the potential of hope. Yet in Chapter Two, 
focusing on Fanon and Wright’s predications of double consciousness, the idea was 
raised that there exists a difficulty in adapting existing vernacular to “double 
consciousness”, considering the great violence and projection of white guilt onto Black 
bodies. In this chapter, following this chronological movement, I compare concepts from 
the first two chapters as interpreted by Gilroy and the contemporary “Afro-Pessimist” 
movements. Finally I return to the figures of Du Bois and Richard Wright and the way 
their lives embodied their intellectual work. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate some of 
the implications these interpretations could have on double consciousness in the 




3.1 Modernity, Post Modernity and Paul Gilroy 
In Chapter One, I already discussed Gilroy’s idea of modernity, but here I look at why he 
chooses to relate this topic to the idea of “double consciousness”. As a historian, Gilroy’s 
work considers the “Black Atlantic” not only as a series of events, but also by using 
specific figures, and symbols to represent a wider network between certain communities 
and cultures. However, the creation of the idea of the Black Atlantic is not so much an 
organic tool to tell these stories and experiences. Rather, his work comes from a place of 
necessity to confront the violence of slavery which had been carefully separated from the 
period known as “modernity” and the particular ideas of this era. Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the African diaspora, Gilroy uses the Black Atlantic to overcome the 
polarization of different African-derived cultures in achieving the common goal of 
liberation.  For Gilroy, the entirety of the trans-Atlantic slave trade falls into the same 
period known as the “modern” period. This era consists of a wide window of many 
centuries, a period which has often been designated by white scholars as the 
“Enlightenment,” and studied mainly in isolation from the history of slavery. Gilroy 
attempts “to develop the suggestion that cultural historians could take the Atlantic as one 
single, complex unit of analysis in their discussions of the modern world and use it to 
produce an explicit transnational and intercultural perspective” (Gilroy 15). To consider 
the meaning of this view one must consider what exactly links together the events that 
make up what is known as “the modern period” (made up of the early modern, which for 
Gilroy takes place roughly from 1500-1800, and the late modern, which he dates from 
1750-1914). The major events associated with this period, like the American and French 
revolutions, in addition to periods of scientific and industrial change in both Europe (and 
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what was becoming) North America, are linked by the fact that they were part of one 
world, the European “West.” The “other world” (i.e. Africa and areas of African 
diaspora) was both non-existent and the object of obsession. This paradox that manifests 
itself in many ways becomes the central focus of this chapter. 
Following Du Bois, Gilroy's retelling of this history and movement through time and 
space is not linear. One comes to understand how his approach to history is in many ways 
exclusively antiracist and anticolonial due to his prioritizing and organizing of 
comparisons of figures from different times or places. The result is that his work does not 
serve to fit itself in as a supplement to already existing historical narratives.  Rather his 
work relates certain moments to one another to paint a picture of Black consciousness 
rooted in social, artistic and academic traditions. Gilroy’s project, like Du Bois’s, then 
becomes an affront to current methodologies of understanding history. It is not an attempt 
to look at the Black Atlantic as a ‘reaction’ to the racism of the past and present, with the 
racism being still the primary event in mainstream perspective. Rather, the events and 
people Gilroy discuss (even if in fact in opposition to the oppression) fundamentally are 
the primary event of that period.  
Consider even the status quo. An example can be made even how students in Canada are 
taught about Canadian history. In the Ontario high school curriculum (updated 2015), the 
government attempts to include more Indigenous history, and more history about 
immigration. In the same breath, the curriculum focuses on students find the “big idea”—
a vague overarching argument—from the topic studied (18). In their own words, even 
long after the “details” and much of the content about the lesson is forgotten by the 
student, they will remember the essence of the “big idea” (18). These ideas are usually 
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broad enough not to offend any particular group, but narrow enough so that it lacks any 
real meaning. Without considering the weight of these “details” students are forced into a 
singularity that does not recognize the potential differences in how perspectives were 
recorded, i.e. historically recording a larger proportion of white settler perspectives.  
These problems are not necessarily limited to history, or any discipline, just like the 
issues of inequality in healthcare addressed in Chapter Two were not limited to medicine. 
Gilroy’s work exposes how academic disciplines such as English and (by extension) 
critical theory are relics of “modernity” out of step with many undeniable realities. These 
disciplines, especially as more and more English departments move towards rebranding 
themselves as “Cultural Studies”, remain very much rooted in the English tradition that 
poses postcolonial studies or race studies as a subgroup (Gilroy 4). In the very language 
of this discussion, Gilroy notes how the word “culture” itself is essentially being used 
interchangeably the way that “race” was used— in a historically racist scientific 
definition (5)  Gilroy embraces these critiques, which creates a space to confront the 
subtleties of slavery, in part to address the disconnect between Black academia and 
mainstream culture, especially in his home in England. He notes that in England, 
polarization based on class or gender limits the effectiveness of a theoretical approach to 
antiracism (320). The problem of inclusivity and representation in academia seems 
closely related to this issue that Gilroy brings up; the lack of representation in certain 
discourse is a symptom of these larger disconnects based on markers like class. With this 
in mind, Gilroy does not only attempt to use his idea of the Black Atlantic in opposition 
to modernity or to contrast it. In some ways the concept is an attempt to formulate an 
adequate response to this period. As Gilroy writes,  
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Though largely ignored by recent debates over modernity and its discontents, 
these ideas about nationality, ethnicity, authenticity and cultural integrity are 
characteristically modern phenomena that have profound implications for cultural 
criticism and cultural history. They crystallized with the revolutionary 
transformations of the West at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries and involved novel typologies and modes of identification. 
Any shift towards a postmodern condition, should not, however, mean that the 
conspicuous power of these modern subjectivities and the movements they 
articulated has been left behind. Their power has, if anything, grown, and their 
ubiquity as a means to make political sense of the world is currently unparalleled 
by the languages of class and socialism by which they once appeared to have been 
surpassed (2). 
Gilroy here demonstrates an innate understanding of the importance of linking questions 
(in varying degrees of abstraction) about nationality, ethnicity and culture not only as 
notions in-themselves, but how they have been put into conversation over the past 
century.  
Implicitly, Gilroy points to the subtleties of language in formulated ideas about the 
differences between “races” and how these ideas represent a mode of violence that was 
carried on past the time period itself. Closely related to the discussion of historic 
scientific racism in Chapter Two of this thesis, Gilroy notes the foundation of concepts 
such as “nationality” as part of this racist or colonial legacyi. This foundational racism is 
reflected in how ideas of “culture” were weaponized against groups who considered 
“barbaric” or “backwards” in comparison to European culture. However, it is also 
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reflected in in the ways that these ideas of “ethnicity” or “culture” then became closely 
related to another in a problematic way. To Gilroy, exclusively associating ethnicity and 
culture (already rooted with these colonial problems) “links the blacks of the West to one 
of their adoptive, parental cultures: the intellectual heritage of the West since the 
Enlightenment” (Gilroy 2).  In Gilroy’s research, he noticed that no matter the political 
stance, an adherence to “cultural nationalism” when theorizing about “histories and 
experiences of “black” and “white” people” was commonly present. The problem of 
identifying oneself with the “parent” culture, i.e. the oppressor’s culture, and with their 
ethnic identity as defined by that specific culture once again creates disruptions in the 
narrative of racial discourse. Du Bois and Gilroy’s method of utilizing elements of this 
“intellectual heritage”, both in a (European and American sense) unilaterally with other 
elements (both in a traditionally African and diasporic sense) results in their work 
overcoming the limits of this cultural nationalism. 
Gilroy then, in reference to a “postmodern condition” mentions a “shift”—the thought of 
which seems stills present today in both academia and more mainstream cultural outlets. 
The mention of a “postmodern condition” by Gilroy is likely alluding to Jean-François 
Lyotard’s 1979 book The Postmodern Condition (42). Lyotard’s idea of what 
“postmodern” means comes in contrast to his idea of what “modern” is. In his definition, 
the “modern” reflects the replacement of gaining knowledge of certain topics such as 
“meaning” and “spirit” with science (including philosophy during this time) (Lyotard 
xxiii). Similarly to Gilroy’s view, for Lyotard “modernity” is closely tied to the 
“Enlightenment period”, as mentioned, a time where intellectuals saw themselves as 
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working toward the perfection of humanity through rationalism.3 Lyotard argues that the 
presence of these kinds of goals  (described as narratives) is what separates the modern 
from the postmodern (xxiv). Referencing Marx’s theory of automation,4 wherein the 
development of machinery separates a worker from the physical process of their work, 
the development of computers and technology have an effect on the transition of 
knowledge (4). Lyotard, in his book, goes further into the relationship of knowledge to 
capitalism and effects of this change, such as the commodification of knowledge (4). One 
of the primary defining factors of postmodernism that Lyotard notes is a fundamental 
shift in language use (15). To elaborate, Lyotard poses that scientific pursuits are now not 
only searching for the answers to different questions than before, but rather the entirety of 
the conversation has changed so that the conversations do not coincide at all (15-17). The 
disconnect of this “postmodern” condition is made possible due to the fluidity of 
language, the ability for the same words to take on different meanings in different 
contexts. The nature of language to do so is then exploited by the unrelinquished 
logicism, which began during the time of the Enlightenment and the new methods of 
transferring and communicating (computers) (17). What knowledge and information has 
(and is) becoming for Lyotard is similar to Benjamin’s idea of shock experience 
 
3 Evidence of this claim can be found in the works of intellectuals during this time, such as in French 
nobleman Marquis de Condorcet’s Sketch of the Progress of the  Human Mind, written in 1765:“The 
superstitions of antiquity and the abasement of reason before the madness of supernatural religion 
disappeared from society just as they had disappeared from philosophy…” regarding the his time, during 
the Enlightenment indicating that both science and philosophy had abandoned religious or “supernatural” 
beliefs in turn for mathematical or logic based ideals. He also writes “We may then conclude that the 
perfectibility of humanity is indefinite” indicating his optimism for the future of humanity through science. 
Strayer, W. Robert., Ways of the World, a Brief Global History with Sources: Since 1500 , 2nd Edition 
(Bedford/ St. Martins 2013) Vol.2, 756-757 
4 See Karl Marx 1939 text Grundrisse 
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introduced in Chapter Two of this paper. As Lyotard writes: “The old principle that the 
acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of 
individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so” (4). The instant 
production of knowledge that one has immediate access to, through phones or computers, 
can be compared in the same way that an individual can experience a series of “shocks” 
that removes them from a sense of history and process.  
Returning to Gilroy’s thoughts on these ideas of postmodernism from Lyotard (as well as 
others such as Frederic Jameson and Jürgen Habermas), if his conception of modernity is 
rooted in relation to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, then so is his conception of 
postmodernism (42). Yet, Gilroy warns that the reality of postmodernism is not as 
removed from the past as Lyotard suggests. Lyotard already points to the notion of the 
commodification of knowledge, such as to serve the interest of the state (as in the 
previously mentioned example of the Ontario school system’s history curriculum). 
However, the callousness of Lyotard’s suggestion that there are no longer overarching 
“narratives” cannot be fully considered when, as discussed earlier, much of the 
recognition of slavery was never made part of the “modern” era (Gilroy 42). To Gilroy, 
the trepidation over abstract entities (such as knowledge) becoming commodified when 
Black bodies had already been commodified shows an improper understanding of 
modernity on the part Western intellectuals (44). As discussed in the case of settler 
colonialism, Lowman and Barker are that the continuation of settler colonial narratives 
will always be necessary in order for settler colonial societies to exist. Gilroy’s 
participation in the conversation of the “crisis of modernity” and interest in how Black 
scholars deal with this issue, while also calling the entire debate “extensive and unusual” 
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and “tied both to the fate of intellectual caste” seems, in some ways, contradictory (43). 
He notes how the entire discussion is better used to witness a kind of cognitive 
dissonance on the part of intellectuals (in modernity) and the role of intellectuals as a 
whole (43). Yet he continues in the discussion of modernity, rewritten with historical 
anecdotes and biographies of important Black figures and artists who contribute 
understanding to this time. For example, he suggests looking to figures such as Frederick 
Douglass’ narratives as an alternative or as supplementary material to Hegel’s master-
slave-dialectic, providing details of Douglass’ life and thoughts on master-slave relations 
(60). 
Gilroy is able to use these contrasting ideas about modernity because he wants to 
emphasize the kind of double consciousness emerging from this intellectual and cultural 
work, existing “inside and outside the conventions” (73).  Gilroy’s idea of double 
consciousness recognizes Du Bois’ original reconciling with race and “American-ness”, 
but ultimately feels that his theory was meant to encompass more than that. He writes, 
about Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk: 
Double consciousness emerges from the unhappy symbiosis between  
 three modes of thinking, being, and seeing. The first is racially particularistic,  
the second nationalist in that in derives from the nation state in which 
 the ex-slaves but not yet citizens find themselves rather than from their  
aspiration towards a nation state of their own. The third is diasporic or  
hemispheric, sometimes global and occasionally universalist. 
This trio was woven into some unlikely but exquisite patterns in  
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Du Bois’s thinking (127). 
As alluded to in Chapter One, Du Bois’ work did not just define “double consciousness” 
but embodied it. Gilroy identifies the typical notion of double consciousness: race and 
nationality. In mentioning a third kind—the “diasporic or hemispheric” he goes beyond 
including and emphasizing Du Bois’ Pan-African vision. One critique Gilroy (among 
others) had made towards thinkers from the Enlightenment was that under the guise of 
universalist claims, such as notions of “egalitarianism” and “freedom”, was truly a kind 
of particularity that only applied to a few intellectuals and privileged individuals of the 
time (59-60). Du Bois’ double consciousness is presented in the opposite way as an 
inversion of this order, beginning with the particular, even personal, and moving outward. 
Gilroy’s approach is not limited solely to this idea, but he embraces the “trio” of Du 
Bois’ double consciousness into his discussion on modernity. Describing double 
consciousness here as “unhappy symbiosis” captures the discomfort of balancing these 
modes of “thinking, being, seeing”, also implying that an element of double 
consciousness exists wherein these modes are not in sync. Even with these unfavourable 
elements, Gilroy’s use of double consciousness as a tool against the singularity of 
modernity ultimately positions him in a “hopeful” light.  
3.2 Despair and Resignation: Afro-Pessimism  
In the next section, I look at the use of “despair” and resignation as tool in the creation of 
Black metaphysics. To do so I will approach the contemporary movement of Afro-
pessimism, situating this movement into Du Bois’ legacy.  The purpose of this section is 
to compare Gilroy’s approach of returning to modernity while dismantling notions of 
cultural nationalism to an approach (from Afro-pessimism) that constitutes a shift of 
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language to achieve some of the same goals. Both approaches build from foundations 
rooted in ideas from Du Bois and Fanon, among others. Afro-pessimism describes itself 
by some of its main contributors and founders, Patrice Douglass, Selamawit D. Terrefe, 
and Frank B. Wilderson as: 
 a lens of interpretations that accounts for civil society’s dependence on 
 antiblack violence—a regime of violence that positions black people 
 as internal enemies of civil society, and cannot be analogized with the 
 regimes of violence that disciplines the Marxist subaltern, the postcolonial 
 subaltern, the colored but nonblack Western immigrant, the nonblack queer, 
 or the nonblack woman. (par. 1) 
While both Gilroy’s work and Afro-pessimist writings address the continual violence of 
slavery that continues to exist in the present, Afro-Pessimists already begin with this 
premise and look at the present. There exists a sense of urgency in the tone of these 
writers, understandably, so that if the reader takes away nothing else from this passage, 
they take away that there is a violence, and it is happening now. Moreover, it is rare, in 
critical theory, to see figures from various complex works (the proletariat, the woman, the 
queer, the postcolonial subaltern) listed side by side callously, when typically each title is 
usually debated and heavily analyzed. Yet here, the writers group them together as to 
denote the differences between them. In resisting the “ruse of analogy” and 
distinguishing antiblack racism from these other forms of oppression, the authors in some 
ways mirror Fanon’s notion (discussed in Chapter Two) that the Black subject actually is 
not a subject at all in the eyes of the World, but an object. Western cultural humanism 
68 
 
hinges on the presence of a shared “humanness” behind each person, regardless of their 
distinct experience of oppression (whether based on gender, sexual orientation, class, or 
race). Afro-pessimism dismisses this idea, not merely from a materialist or “experiential” 
perspective but rather from the “ontological” idea that Black people cannot be lumped 
into this definition of “human”. The reasons for the difference, according to the founders 
of Afro-pessimism, are that firstly the kind of violence inflicted is different. Secondly, 
they do believe that Black people possess “the inability to share in the same kind of 
trajectory of liberation as other populations” (par. 1). They argue that the positioning of 
all Black populations, regardless of country or culture is unique to the positioning of any 
other othered or embodied person that is addressed by critical theorists.  
Gilroy’s work, while recognizing the violence that is so central to the Afro-pessimist 
analysis, still uses the idea of “successive displacements, migrations and journey’s forced 
and otherwise which have come to constitute those black cultures” as a point of 
connection between these communities versus the idea of violence alone (112). Using the 
present as a point of departure, Afro-pessimists have reconstituted (or claimed to have) an 
idea of “Being” that has arguable remained static through many periods of thought. 
3.3 Conceptualizing Afro-Pessimists and Violence  
Keeping in mind both of these critiques on modernity, this next section will conceptualize 
the idea of doubleness using the concept of “the anxiety of antagonism” created by the 
founders of Afro-pessimism.  
As a contemporary movement, Afro-pessimism has even been discussed in mainstream 
publications such as The New Yorker, including the idea that Black populations live in a 
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perpetual state of “social death” (“The Argument of Afro-pessimism” by Vinson 
Cunningham (2020)). Afropessimists do not dwell on the individual differences between 
Black communities based on nationality.  Afropessimist thinkers argues that such 
considerations are “inessential to a paradigmatic analysis” (par. 2).  Gilroy would seem to 
agree with notion of not needing to conflate culture and nationality. Yet in rejecting these 
sociological categories, one notes Gilroy’s slower approach in painting an entire picture, 
moving from geographical locations to different moments in time.  The Afropessimists 
write in a very different way, as stated in the Oxford Bibliographies entry on Afro-
Pessimism, written by some of the founders and main contributors of the movement: 
What is essential is neither the interpersonal nor institutional orientation toward 
blackness, but the fact that blackness is the essence of that which orients. Put 
differently, the coherence of reality (be it institutional or interpersonal coherence) 
is secured by anxiety over both the idea and the presence of blacks. The black, to 
paraphrase Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967, cited under Afro-Pessimism and 
Psychoanalysis), is a stimulus to anxiety, and it is the anxiety of antagonism 
(Sexton 2016) represented and embodied by blackness that creates the condition 
of possibility for both the rigid one-drop rule and the catholic plethora of shades 
that are named in countries like Cuba and Brazil. (par. 2) 
The ancient philosophical problem of what is essential is one which in many ways had 
been abandoned in the age of modernity by European philosophers. But for Afro-
pessimist philosophers, the present lived reality of Black people demands that the 
problem of essence be taken up again. Gilroy’s work focused on the erasure of the 
African diaspora and trans-Atlantic slave trade from the conception of modernity in 
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history. In putting forward of the idea of Blackness being “a stimulus to anxiety, 
and…the anxiety of antagonism” to once again demonstrate that at the same time as 
being erased, Black bodies became an object to project this anxiety of whites. In Chapter 
Two, Fanon’s notion of Blackness being a “symbol of sin” from Black Skins, White 
Masks resonates with this kind of projection.  
The concept of anxiety used by Fanon originates from his conceptions of psychoanalysis. 
Fanon’s body of work describes in great detail the kinds of subconscious effects that 
racism and colonization have on the psyche of an individual, some of which were 
discussed in Chapter Two. While Fanon’s work derived from his own practice and 
observations, Afro-pessimists in this context do not situate this idea with any particular 
time or place. This implies that even in the present, the status of being “a stimulus to 
anxiety” has not changed. In Black Skin, White Masks this restricting force is contrasted 
with the radical freedom of existentialism, as inspired by one of Fanon’s mentors, Jean-
Paul Sartre. This pattern is found too in Wilderson’s definition placing the discussion of 
essence beside the idea of anxiety. As Wilderson and Douglass argue in “The Violence of 
Presence: metaphysics in a blackened world,” the juxtaposition of the philosophical and 
psychoanalytic problems of essence and anxiety is intentional:   
We contend that black philosophy should continue to pursue this kind of 
juxtaposition: an irreverent clash between ensembles of questions dedicated to the 
status of the subject as a relational being and ensembles of questions dedicated to 
what are more often thought of as general and fundamental problems, such as 
those connected with reality, existence, reason, and mind; in the form, 
specifically, of a clash between questions concerning the always already 
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deracination of blackness and questions, for example, of metaphysics—rather 
than pursue a line of inquiry that assumes a stable and coherent philosophical 
vantage point from which a black metaphysics can be imagined. This is because, 
as we argue below, for blacks no such vantage point exists. Such a project could 
stand the assumptive logic of philosophy on its metaphysical and ethical head; 
just as a similarly blackened project has turned the assumptive logic of critical 
theory (specifically, its starting point, which assumes subjectivity) on its relational 
head. (117) 
As discussed earlier in the context of modernity, Gilroy was let down by thinkers who 
conceptualized ideas about modernity and post modernity. Yet these thinkers had the 
privilege a of connection to their heritage to build on—a luxury not awarded to all.  Even 
if certain philosophical movements became affected by historical events, such as wars or 
industrialization and was thus reflected in mainstream academic thought, slavery was not. 
The idea of a “vantage point”—especially having no vantage point, contrasts with Du 
Bois’ idea of a “second sight”. As alluded to in Chapter One, Du Bois’ double 
consciousness could potentially provide one with a more insightful ability to see the 
world. But if one is not given the vantage point to put it to use (i.e. opportunities, 
education) it could become a “dreadful objectivity”— Richard Wright’s definition of 
double consciousness, which implies a bleak fate (Gilroy 30).  
In some ways Gilroy uses the example of various figures to create “vantage points”. In 
Chapter Four of The Black Atlantic, Gilroy’s focus on Du Bois’ life itself rather than 
solely his work could be considered a representation of the project Wilderson and 
Douglass pursue. In Chapter One, I already presented the question of Du Bois’ legacy, 
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and his life in terms of his outsider status at the university. Gilroy recounts Du Bois’ 
extensive travels without settling in one place for too long. His travels began after the 
first World War to Europe and spanned his lifetime until his death in Ghana at age 95—
where he had in fact renounced his American citizenship altogether (117). Du Bois’ 
movements across continents, and movements politically, serves not only as a historical 
reference, but demonstrates in many ways his personal testimony of struggling with 
identity throughout his life. Despite his changing stances on various issues throughout his 
work or moving to various countries, his life enriched his work through this twofold 
nature. Though he could have had a profitable career in the United States, his rejection of 
the status quo and the “American Dream”, in part contributed majorly to American 
culture.  
When one reads Du Bois’ definition of double consciousness, there is a sense of 
familiarity one feels, even if they do not themselves relate to that particular experience. 
On a macro level, the imagery of modernity is that of a whole, a singularity, and the 
image of post modernity is fragmentation; this is often projected on the idea of the self. 
One sees the idea in psychoanalysis the idea of conflicting parts of one’s 
unconsciousness, and in Benjamin’s idea of shock experience discussed in Chapter Two, 
for example. This point is made by Wilderson in the article “Grammar & Ghosts: The 
Performative Limits of African Freedom”. The article discusses the way in which 
gatherings of people with roots from the African diaspora, a conference in his specific 
case, often result in “a palpable structure of feeling, a shared sense that violence and 
captivity are the grammar and ghosts of our every gesture” (Wilderson 119). He 
specifically mentions the delicate issue of some Black artists preferring to be known 
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“simply as artists, not as African or black artists” (122). As a critical theorist, Wilderson 
is familiar with how theorists such as Marx and Freud and Lacan, all deal with the 
“”partitioned”” nature of our existence” (ibid). To Wilderson, though these ideas suggest 
that all artists, regardless or race gender, cannot be free of such “taints” (ibid). The 
subjects theorized by the examples used by Wilderson are faced with the  “mystifications 
of the ruling class (Marx), the ego (Freud), or the Imaginary (Lacan)” but not with the 
unique violence of “enslavement” that African-derived people do (ibid). Thus, as an for 
Wilderson, it is incredibly important that the idea of the self in this case cannot be 
conflated with identity or experience but rather ontologically. Gilroy begins this process 
by rooting the existential erasure of Blackness in modernity, and advocating for the 
centralization of Slavery to be at the basis conception of modernity. Double 
consciousness is both a way to know the self that is both ontological and based in 
experience. In one way, Du Bois describes double consciousness as a way of a “feeling” 
and how one relates to the self. In another, double consciousness situates this mode of 
being in the particular history of the African diaspora and Slavery, as part of a particular 
process. Therefore, in looking more in depth at Wilderson’s ideas in Afro-pessimism 
stemming from the violence inflicted toward African-derived groups in modernity, 
double consciousness could be  used to bridge the dissonance between the ontological 
and existential language to rewrite these narratives.  
Wilderson and Douglass also allude to the ability of the new metaphysics to turn some of 
the premises of both philosophy and critical theory on its “head”. In the case of critical 
theory as stated: “specifically, its starting point, which assumes subjectivity”.  They are 
alluding not to the use of subjectivity itself but rather the use of subjectivities as 
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interpretation: all subjectivities being equally true but simply different lenses of 
perspective. In the entry on Afro-pessimism (2018), the authors mention their 
indebtedness to black feminist writers: not only, to their credit, for their privileging of 
“position (or paradigm) over performance”, but also for recognizing the clear difference 
between the plight of white feminists and feminists of colour. The cross-section between 
racism and sexism, or class may now be considered to be “covered” under ideas such as 
intersectionality; however such terms may not be an influential enough conception to 
prevent the issues of white female subjects being prioritized. Thus, Afro-pessimists have 
created a shift in language, removing the equation of subjectivity altogether.  
Fanon articulates this kind of subject/object split in various ways, and in this articulation 
there is an always present and reoccurring idea of violence. For Afro-pessimists, the 
paradigmatic nature of anti-Black violence is part of the “jump” separating Blackness 
from other subjectivities who have experienced oppression or violence. The idea of 
violence is elaborated on further in “The Violence of Presence: metaphysics in a 
blackened world” by Douglass and Wilderson. In this article, they claim the work that of 
Elaine Scarry, an American academic, in her 1985 book The Body in Pain: The Making 
and Unmaking of the World “advanced” the idea of the subject in critical theory. In 
Wilderson and Douglass’ conception of Scarry’s theory, the victim of “torture” or the 
person who pain has been inflicted on is at risk of losing their “metaphysical presence”, 
destroying if not their essence, then their ability to come to know themselves (118). 
However, Douglass and Wilderson contrast Scarry’s idea with the work of contemporary 
poet and scholar John Murillo: 
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John Murillo describes the psychic life of black people as no life at all. (14) In 
other words, for Murillo, neither torture nor the havoc wreaked by war qualifies 
as an event that affects the metaphysical plentitude of black life because blackness 
is constituted by an injunction against metaphysics, against, that is, black people's 
attempts to clarify the fundamental notions by which people understand the world, 
for example, existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and 
effect, and above all possibility. (118) 
The idea presented by Murillo confirms the Afro-Pessimist usage of the term “a priori” to 
position Blackness—as a “slave” (118). Despite the literal physical violence that targets 
Black populations in addition to other kinds of systemic violence, Murillo “argues that 
the fragmenting process the black psyche undergoes is beyond "the event horizon," 
unlike Scarry's subject whose event horizon is the episode(s) of torture. For Murillo, the 
event horizon is not a narrative moment, or a moment that can be narrated, but being 
itself” (121). Note that in the analogy of the event horizon, rather than there existing an 
“event” of violence, the violence becomes the point of no return to lose oneself—but this 
is still a definitive point. Returning to the idea of violence, Scarry claims her victim loses 
the ability to “know herself as a relational being”, due to the pain and torture inflicted, 
which Wilderson and Douglass agree with. However, even this statement alone is 
partially contradictory. Depending on the reasons for torture (i.e. the victim’s beliefs or 
convictions)—it may actually strengthen their relationality to the reason. In this case—
the necessary element to their being, the body, is being destroyed on account of 
something that is a “relation to the self” and for this reason their humanness or “being” is 
still intact. In the case of the necessary element of one’s being destroyed on the basis of 
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another necessary element to their being, this is different. It is especially different when 
the one who is being targeted is not privy to a certain time or reason. When the violence 
continues for hundreds of years, there is no “event horizon”, it simply manifests in 
different ways. Thus Douglass and Wilderson do not identify with the torture victim from 
Scarry’s account. The respective forms of violence cannot be made to relate analogically.  
In the rejection of subjectivity and identification with Scarry’s victim one is left with the 
idea of, in some ways, resignation to a kind of despair. Afro-pessimism may be a 
contemporary movement but even long before Fanon, “pessimism” played an important 
role in the history of Black consciousness. Discussed earlier in this chapter, Gilroy 
compared the narrative of Frederick Douglass to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. 
According to Gilroy, in Hegel’s allegory, the slave “prefers his master’s version of reality 
to death” (63). To Douglass, however, the (actual) slave would prefer death rather than 
continuing the “inhumanity on which plantation slavery depends” (63). The idea of this 
death reflects the idea of the “social death”, Murillo’s description of “having no life at 
all” and Fanon’s “feeling of not existing”: all of which allude to a kind of resignation. As 
discussed in chapter Two of this paper, in Black Skins, White Masks Fanon speaks of 
(what I had called a kind of double consciousness) the power, yet possibility of self-
destruction in acknowledgement of society’s views, especially associating Blackness with 
a kind of “darkness” (Fanon 174). There is sense of a similar kind of notion in Afro-
pessimism: on the one hand the destructiveness of a “social death”. On the other hand, 
Afro-pessimists do believe that in accepting the premises of such as lens, there exists the 
power to create a new metaphysics and philosophical traditions.  
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3.4 Noted Critiques of Afro-Pessimism  
There are many fair critiques of the controversial Afro-pessimist movement, and as a 
contemporary movement, discourse is constantly evolving. In “Afro-Blue: The Death of 
Afro-Pessimism” by Greg Thomas, using ideas from Gloria Emeagwali, he critiques the 
movement and main contributors on some of the following points:  
a. Ignoring or misreading many historical events 
b. Misreading of certain texts and authors 
c. Selectively reading certain texts (i.e. Only Black Skins, White Masks of Fanon’s 
work), and also reading many white scholars over Black scholars who have 
contributed to the topic in the past, yet remarketing the movement as wholly 
“new” 
d.  Being highly American-centric (resulting in “throwing” away Pan-Africanism 
and discussions of Africa altogether) 
e.  Playing into a view of Africa or Africans that already is incredibly bleak and 
negative 
f. The use of “pessimism” in a nihilist way—not in a productive sense, but rather in 
a hopeless way  
g. Generically referring to complex ideas (i.e. feminism and Marxism) and in a sense 
“throwing them out” when many important Black theorists and activists have used 
and continue to use these ideas in antiracist contexts 
and finally, 
h. Differentiation of violence and suffering of Black people compared to that of 
other colonized subalterns, in many ways even differentiating Black-
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colonialization in Africa or South America from the specific system of slavery in 
the United States 
 While all of these critiques could be applied to my own paper, I agree with many of 
Thomas’ evaluations. The “trendiness” of Afro-pessimism is suspicious in the sense that, 
given the racist roots of Western academia, a movement that uses the language of Afro-
pessimism, (especially referring to Black people as “slaves” and not “human”) could play 
in to white fetishism of violence against Black bodies, although meant to make a point 
about the current systemic racism towards Black folks. Taking on such a language with 
proper care could be a challenge for many universities who already struggle to prioritize 
race and Africana studies as well as having diverse faculty. The ways in which students 
are taught about race—even if done so in a “progressive manner” reinforces a 
narrative of the status quo—even if not that is not the professor’s or institution’s 
intention. This was one point made earlier addressed by Gilroy, as he noted the roots of 
ideas about nationality and race as problematic. To elaborate, consider one of the most 
the widely read novels in academic institutions, Heart of Darkness (1899) by Joseph 
Conrad. The students (and professors) may read and discuss how the characters construct 
Africa as the “blank space on the map” or, as Chinua Achebe writes in his criticism, as “a 
metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity” (Achebe 6).  Achebe has a 
difficult task in critiquing the beloved book, especially when proponents of Conrad’s 
work argue that the book demonstrates the inhumanity of Europeans (in their cruelty in 
the book) more than that of Africans. Yet, as Achebe argues, Conrad did not invent the 
view of Africa or Africans as portrayed in the book, he simply used his talent to exploit 
the already unchallenged image of the continent: “reducing Africa to the role of props for 
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the break-up of one petty European mind” (Achebe 6). Critiques like Achebe’s are then 
taken out of the fictional context and taught to dismantle the colonial attitudes in the 
book. Yet subliminally, “the blank space on the map” idea still lingers—and so does the 
human nature of holding onto something, even long after our mind tells us to change.  
From Heart of Darkness, to Gone with the Wind, to Django Unchained, some of the most 
popular media consumed at large—whether for critical, “educational” or entertainment 
purposes, contains the romanticism and fetishism of violence towards Black bodies. This 
is not to say that these histories should not be taught, but given the widespread learning 
through colonial perspectives and popularity of consuming these images of violence 
provides evidence for Afro-pessimism’s claims of society’s obsession with the 
consumption of violence towards Black people. In utilizing certain language that is 
reflective of this violent image, Afro-pessimism could be appropriated by the Western 
psyche if not approached cautiously.  
3.5 Double Consciousness and Afro-Pessimism 
Thomas and Emeagwali also critique Afro-pessimism for generalizing certain movements 
and theories and pushing certain ideas “aside”, so to speak. Thomas is right in his 
concern that the thinkers of this group could partly be too disconnected from society to 
throw away notions that many groups who have been subjugated still find useful. For 
example, the #BlackLivesMatter movement and its founders have clear roots in LGBTQ 
and feminist movements as well as advocating for socialist ideals that could be 
considered Marxist. They are still are able to prioritize Black issues while keeping 
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relational ties towards these other marginalized subjectivities.5 That being said, work on 
Afro-pessimism (“Afro pessimism” ((unhyphenated)) continue to branch from the main 
doctrine in certain ways, addressing some of the critiques already addressed. In “Afro 
pessimism,” Lewis R. Gordon, Annie Menzel, George Shulman and Jasmine Syedullah 
begin by differentiating their “Afro pessimism” from the hyphenated “Afro-pessimissm” 
of Wilderson and Douglass:  
What Baldwin and Cullors make clear is that pessimism is most powerful as an 
unrelenting political process of coming back to life, beginning to feel one 
another’s humanity. What my students who are taking up the work of Afro-
pessimism are in most need of new ways to put their pessimism to work, to come 
together and collectively counteract the mind-numbing soul-crushing isolation 
centuries of antiblack racism have waged on our humanity. We need not fear 
falling short. The more we ‘‘fail,’’ the stronger we rise to try again armed with the 
alchemy of despair. What we need are stories and speeches, and spaces that 
moves us from abjection toward that fertile ground of self-transformation one can 
only find in the witness of another. (113) 
An entire premise of what is proposed by Wilderson and contemporaries is still present in 
the notion of “Afro pessimism” (unhyphenated): the presence of violence from Slavery is 
present. A difference between Afro pessimism and Afro-pessimism lies in the way that 
both movements are being used. Douglass and Wilderson radicalize the notion of 
 
5
 From the manifesto on blacklivesmatter.com: https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/ 
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pessimism in order to, in some ways, shock the reader into recognizing the dire need for 
political and social change. In doing so, they forgo the possibility of personal healing in 
favour of revolutionizing thought. In Scarry’s description, the victim of violence is able 
to heal after going through various stages. To be more precise in the article “The 
Violence of Presence: metaphysics in a blackened world”, three such stages are 
described: 
a narrative progression from equilibrium to disequilibrium. And the first of two 
stages in the narrative progression holds forth the promise of a third stage: 
equilibrium restored; a closure stage--healing, or what we might call metaphysical 
renewal: the reinstation of objects and their properties, space and time, cause and 
effect (121).  
This description seems similar to understandings of trauma—despite the kinds or 
variations it is mainly a one-dimensional trajectory that leads to a place of healing.  
Douglass and Wilderson argue that a Black person does not go through these stages in 
terms of individual “experience”. In “Afro pessimism” however, pessimism is used as a 
method of “self-transformation”. In a sense, this is revolutionary by simply allowing the 
students to be “pessimistic” about the “soul-crushing isolation centuries of antiblack 
racism have waged”. In Chapter One of the thesis, Sarah Ahmed’s work 
“Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness” was taken up as an example of the way 
in which “happiness” and “multiculturalism” have become value systems enforced in 
capitalist societies. Ultimately these value systems attempt to force communities to 
experience their history and form an identity in a way that does not disturb the rest of 
society. “Pessimism”, however, is not a value system that can be enforced. There is not a 
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goal that is necessarily achieved by despair but rather the possibility of what can 
organically arise, especially in a collective setting as suggested in “Afro pessimism”. 
The authors of “Afro pessimism” describe themselves and their students as “armed with 
the alchemy of despair”. While keeping the same foundation as Wilderson and Douglass 
of an inherent presence of violence, the writing here reflects a closer connection to Du 
Bois. To describe the despair of the legacy of slavery as an “alchemy” is reflective of Du 
Bois using the term “Seventh Son” in his description of double consciousness: they both 
use metaphors of mythical elements (Du Bois 9). Both metaphors could take on two 
possible meanings. In the context we have been using thus far, the use of the idea of a 
magic or the supernatural implies the individual possessing a special ability, such as 
insight. In many cultures the goal of the “science” of alchemy was to turn metal into gold 
or to create an elixir of immortality. The idea of the “unrelenting political process of 
coming back to life, beginning to feel one another’s humanity” uses the language of this 
supernatural transformation. In light of the “social death”, a “coming back to life” , 
something Wilderson and Douglass claim cannot happen so long as the white supremacist 
paradigm of Humanism persists, it is possible the “alchemy of despair” is a way to 
(jokingly) refute their argument by miraculously overcoming this “impossibility”. 
However, there could too be a notion of cynicism in the use of these metaphors. The 
goals of alchemy were always out of reach no matter how many times they were pursued. 
The goals of antiracism similarly have yet to be reached and the authors may be noting 
that despite the progress made in self-transformation, systemic political change is 




Double consciousness too can be read as a kind of despair, despite holding the divergent 
potential meaning as a “gift”. Thus far, I have mainly conflated the experience of double 
consciousness to a singular person—the alienation of that person, the objectification, to 
quote Gilroy their existence “inside and outside conventions” (Gilroy 73). Du Bois poses 
double consciousness in terms of a singular body in The Souls of Black Folk: “two 
warring ideals in one dark body” (9). Of course Du Bois is not literally referring to one 
singular body, or even necessarily a sole Black body, but analogizing (to borrow from 
Gilroy) a “diasporic or hemispheric, sometimes global and occasionally universalist” 
experience (Gilroy 127). Yet for a collective experience as adapted by thinkers such as 
Gilroy, Du Bois still emphasizes that it is the individual’s “dogged strength alone [that] 
keeps it from being torn asunder”, (the “it” referring to the body) which implies double 
consciousness is very much a solitary situation. (Du Bois 9). The solitude and collective 
elements of double consciousness are already expressed in various forms of expression 
by Black artists and thinkers. The article “Afro Pessimism” claims that a transformation 
can occur only in “the witness of another”. If this is so, more space could be created in 
the academic world (in the proper framework without falling into concerns previously 
discussed) that allow students to not only engage—but be armed with despair, pessimism 
and double consciousness, as is already being done by the writers of “Afro Pessimism”. 
The idea of resignation was brought up earlier in regards to Murillo’s notion of a Black 
individual having “no life at all” and Fanon’s notion of “not existing”. It is also taken up 




In existential terms, then, many ancestors of the African diaspora embodied what 
Søren Kierkegaard calls an existential paradox. All the evidence around them 
suggested failure and the futility of hope. They first had to make a movement of 
infinite resignation – that is, resigning themselves to their situation. Yet they must 
simultaneously act against that situation. Kierkegaard called this seemingly 
contradictory phenomenon ‘‘faith,’’ but that concept relates more to a relationship 
with a transcendent, absolute being, which could only be established by a ‘‘leap,’’ 
as there are no mediations or bridge. (109-110) 
It is interesting that Kierkegaard also theorized the idea of a kind of “pessimism” in 
resignation. The contradiction of resigning oneself to the situation but also acting against 
it is similar to the way to the way Fanon expresses the contradiction of being consider 
morally inferior but also at the receiving end of violence (Fanon 174). As Fanon’s 
scenario ends in a kind of destruction, alluding to the idea that before the “leap” can be 
made structural political changes must be made. Fanon’s use of the sad fate of Bigger 
Thomas from Native Son can be used as an example of a “leap” without a bridge (Fanon 
118). He implies in this scenario, the only action possible is the one that “answers the 
world’s expectations” (ibid). In other words, Bigger has the illusion of action, or the 
illusion of free will.  
3.6 Richard Wright and Double Consciousness  
In Chapter Two, I discussed Richard Wright’s Native Son in regards to the character of 
Bigger Thomas and the manifestation of double consciousness in affect and in  Fanon’s 
Black Skins, White Masks. Certainly some of the book’s topics seem that they were meant 
to be read in an Afro-pessimistic light, such as the question of subjectivity and the role of 
85 
 
violence. I argue that Bigger does not “become” violent as the violence had already been 
present, and I believe Afro-pessimists would agree. Yet the subjectivity of Bigger 
demands a bigger question be asked of the implications of Afro-pessimism, and by 
default, of double consciousness. I already discussed the limitations to Bigger’s 
“freedom” in chapter Two, which seemed aligned with the idea of the “social death”. 
Now, using the figure of Richard Wright himself I will look further at how existentialism 
influenced him and his ideas on “freedom”—determining where double consciousness 
and freedom intersect.  
In The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy recounts Wright’s life, in a similar manner to the way 
he recounts Du Bois’ life. Like Du Bois, after achieving immense success in the United 
States after the publishing of his book, Wright traveled extensively, both to Europe and 
Africa. Also like Du Bois, Wright notes that his travels had a massive impact on his point 
of view, claiming, for example, that “[the] break from the U.S. was more than a 
geographical change. It was a break with my former attitudes” (Qtd in Gilroy 165). 
Describing how he was always occupied with thinking about the “problem” of Western 
society and the relation of Black people (and other people of colour) to it, Wright refers 
to the idea of double consciousness as a “dreadful objectivity” (he referred to it as 
“double vision” as well) (ibid). The realism of Native Son certainly depicts this dreadful 
objectivity with unadorned clarity.   
Reading further into Wright’s life however, the ambiguity of his beliefs and extent of his 
influences are often overlooked. Wright was politically active as a Marxist while also 
being a sophisticated critic of Marxism. He explored a wide variety of European 
philosophers throughout his life and travels (159). In relation to modernity, Gilroy writes 
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that: “For Wright the decisive break in western consciousness which modernity identifies 
was defined by the collapse of a religious understanding of the world” (160). This 
definition of modernity does not directly relate the time period of modernity to Slavery as 
is done by Gilroy, however, it is notable that Wright looked backed on understanding this 
time period. 
One important figure that also influenced Wright was Kierkegaard. Gilroy retells, not 
something written by Wright on Kierkegaard, but rather a personal experience which 
potentially says more than any analysis. He recalls on page 159 a story where a man 
named C.L.R. James went to visit Wright and his family in France. James saw that 
Wright was reading many books by Kierkegaard, and claimed that everything he read in 
Kierkegaard he had already learned from experience (159). Gilroy goes on to explain: 
James suggests that Wright’s apparently intuitive foreknowledge of the issues 
raised by Kierkegaard was not intuitive at all. It was an elementary product of his 
historical experiences as a black growing up in the Unites States between the 
wars: “What [Dick] was telling me was that he was a black man in the United 
States and that gave him an insight into what today is the universal opinion and 
attitude of the modern personality (emphasis added). (159) 
Wright grew up during a time of great change in America; for himself personally, his 
childhood was defined by constantly moving across the South. It was here Wright was 
constantly facing obstacles and racism. In the late 1920s, he joined the “Great Migration” 
and moved to Chicago, joining many others who moved to mid-Western cities for better 
economic opportunities during this time. Moving to a big city may be what is referred to 
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as giving him an “insight…of the modern personality”. Kierkegaard’s idea of the 
“modern” stems from the loss of individuality and a move towards crowds and 
“sameness” (Kierkegaard 61). As mentioned, Wright was an active Marxist and Chicago 
was where he worked with a white communist group, serving likely his inspiration for the 
characters of Mary Dalton and Jan in Native Son. The idea of “sameness” comes out in 
Wright’s description of the city in Native Son and may be inspired by Wright’s time 
there. For Bigger, the city is not a place of opportunity and excitement, he walks around 
seeing the city described by Wright as cold, grey walls, the same white faces on build 
boards, “mechanical” (Wright 14-15). Wright, whether intentionally or not took a “leap 
of faith” in a Kierkegaardian sense. While he struggled with his own image of West, he 
decided to act by moving move abroad. 
In his writings on double consciousness, Wright’s “black subject is internally divided by 
cultured affiliation, citizenship, and the demands of national and racial identity” (161). 
To Gilroy, this demonstrates a difference from Du Bois’ original idea because Wright 
focuses more on “unconscious aspects” rather than then Du Bois’ idea of “two warring 
souls in one black body” (161). That being said, inspired by Nietzsche, Gilroy believes 
that Wright’s conception of “double consciousness” or “double vision” (without 
considering it purely hindrance or advantage) was similar to Du Bois’ in the idea of 
“perspectival ways of knowing” (161). Furthermore, Wright also used the idea of 
doubling or doubleness to describe a “splitting process” (162). However in both his 
personal journey to know himself along with his challenges to reconcile his views he 




In Wright’s mature position, [black people are] no longer just America’s 
metaphor but as a central symbol in the psychological, cultural, and political 
systems of the West as a whole. (159)  
Though highlighting the specific position in this quote of blackness, he is inclusive-- he 
connects the United States with the broader network of nations with roots this history. 
Like Afro-pessimists, Du Bois, Gilroy, and Fanon, though taking different routes, each 
take on different modes of thought that recentralizes Black folks into a grand narrative. 
The controversy and discussion about Afro-pessimism (and Afro pessimism) will surely 
evolve in the upcoming years. The reader may agree or not agree with the situating of 
subjectivities (or lack of) and use of language in this movement, or feel it is not their 
position to comment. Gilroy showed—carefully—how understanding of modernity and 
post modernity is largely based on the cognitive dissonance of the erasure of Black 
culture and history, and most importantly Black lives. The pain and injustice of this 
history is still very much present. So, the irreverence, urgency and abrasiveness built into 
the tone of Afro-pessimism, while not taken well by some, is understandable. Relating 
this movement to figures such as Wright and Du Bois is important to maintain historical 
foundations rooted fully in the history of the system of slavery and racial dynamics in the 
America, but also a wider global perspective. The spirit and poetry from these authors 
can help guide the academic community (and wider society) as it interrogates its own 
systemic racism. It is also important, however, to relate Du Bois’ double consciousness to 
the Afro-pessimist movement (or other movements for that matter) not only as a tool. The 
gift of “double consciousness” that Du Bois passed on contests the postmodern tenet that 
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